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J.E.Creighton.

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Some Problems

OF

Lotze's Theory of Knowledge

BY

EDWIN PROCTOR ROBINS, M.A.

Late Scholar and Fellow of Cornell University

EDITED WITH A BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION

BY

J. E. CREIGHTON

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INTRODUCTION.

This monograph was written while the author was a graduate student at Cornell University, and was intended as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Although the author had intended before publishing to add to the work an historical introduction dealing with the position of philosophy in Germany at the time when Lotze's views were forming, and had collected some material for this purpose, the study of Lotze which he had undertaken was in all essentials complete at the time of his death. The first chapter had been rewritten and revised, and the remaining chapters, although lacking the author's final touch, would not probably have been changed greatly either in form or substance. In preparing the manuscript for the press, I have made no changes except in occasional passages where the addition or substitution of a word or phrase seemed necessary in order to render the meaning clearer. With regard to the general method and purpose of the study a word may be necessary. The author purposely refrained from criticism of particular passages or isolated statements in the system with which he was dealing. The aim of his study was sympathetically to interpret the spirit of Lotze's system as a whole—to do justice to the philosopher by taking him at his best rather than to exhibit the literal inconsistencies of his system.

Edward Proctor Robins was born at Central Bedeque, Prince Edward Island, July 2, 1872. After passing through the primary and grammar schools of his native place, he entered Prince of Wales College, Charlottetown, at the age of sixteen. In the fall of 1891 he matriculated into Dalhousie College, Halifax, N. S. Although his preparation would have enabled him to enter the second year in any Canadian college, he characteristically preferred to take the full four years' course. Besides philosophy, to which he devoted special attention during the last two years of his collegiate course, mathematics, physics, botany,

and political economy were the subjects which specially engaged his attention. He received the degree of B.A. from Dalhousie College in 1895, and after another year's residence, that of M.A. in 1896. In the fall of the latter year he came to Cornell University and for three years carried on graduate studies in philosophy and psychology, being twice elected to a graduate scholarship, and at the time of his death, holding a fellowship in the Sage School of Philosophy. He died on April 19, 1899, after an illness of three days, having nearly completed his twenty-seventh year.

Besides a number of reports on periodical literature and new books contributed from time to time to the *Philosophical Review*, Robins published in the same journal a few months before his death an important article entitled "Modern Theories of Judgment." In the psychological laboratory he had taken part as subject in several important investigations, and was for some months before his death, himself engaged in studying complex taste-sensations, working especially at an analysis of metallic and alkaline tastes which have a 'burning' or 'pricking' quality. From reports made to Professor Titchener it is certain that his investigation yielded important results. Unfortunately, however, these can not be published, as it was found impossible to fully decipher the abbreviated notes in which the records of his experiments had been made.

It would be out of place to dwell here upon the intellectual promise of the author, or to attempt any appreciation of his personal character. Apart from the importance which attaches to this monograph as a contribution to the history of philosophy, for those who knew Robins personally it will have a value as a memorial of the man.

J. E. C.

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CHAPTER I.

PROBLEM AND METHOD.

Introduction.

LOTZE'S many-sidedness at once attracts the notice of the reader. He seems to represent in turn almost every system of philosophy, and also to deny that a system of knowledge is possible. Many scholars know Lotze chiefly as a realist, and class his philosophy with the anti-idealism which is so common at the present time. From this point of view he is attacked by critics who regard him as the enemy of all true philosophy, and his realism as the antithesis of sound idealism.¹ On the other hand there are those who sympathize with Lotze, and agree that all knowledge is empirical; but these critics are not satisfied because he does not renounce entirely the philosophical method.² Others who identify his idealism with an abstract monism find in Lotze an explicit realism as the kernel of his system, and maintain that any attempt to formulate his philosophy idealistically is wrong, and makes Lotze say just the opposite of that which he intended to uphold. According to this interpretation, Lotze is not a monist (idealist), but a pluralist.³ A fourth class of thinkers find in Lotze the champion of the heart against the head, and regard his philosophy as a resolute and by no means unsuccessful attempt to show that truth is broader than intellect, and that human experience is as extensive as man's total being, and is not limited to the function of understanding or reason alone. Even Lotze's opponents recognize this concession to feeling and will as elements in the mind, but remark sarcastically that now theologians "may take new heart," for this theory "trusts the heart against the head."⁴ Again there are those who regard Lotze as an idealist—they claim that for him the world is a spiritual unity,

¹ Cf. Jones: *Phil. of Lotze*, Preface.

² Külpe: *Outlines of Psy.* (Eng. trans.), p. 26.

³ Schiller: *Lotze's Monism*, Phil. Rev., V, pp. 225-245.

⁴ Jones: *Op. cit.*, Pref., pp. xi, xii.

and that all individual things have worth and value only in relation to the whole.¹ Lastly, Lotze is termed by some a mere eclectic, who gathered together a great many different points of view, but was not able to bring them into a unified system.² Thus it appears that the interpretations of Lotze's philosophy are many. At one time he is called a realist, at another, a faithful philosopher, and again he is regarded as an idealist, or even a mere eclectic. Kronenberg sums up the various criticisms in the following way: "Our philosopher is on the one side regarded as an Herbartian, on the other as a Leibnitzian, or even as a follower of Spinoza. Some are of opinion that Lotze is a speculative theist or the restorer of ancient rationalism, others assert that he is simply an ordinary eclectic."³ Whence comes this diversity of opinion, and how are we to explain the fact of so many interpretations of Lotze's philosophy?

It is a common experience that, for the most part, we find what we look for, and do not observe that which does not interest us.⁴ This is no doubt one reason why so many various interpretations have been put upon Lotze's philosophy. But the personal equation present in every investigation will not explain the whole fact, though it is a necessary factor. Besides this subjective condition of knowledge, there is an objective basis just as essential.⁵ Lotze's philosophy is a source from which many can draw. He saw the many sides of experience, and was great enough not to desire the reduction of the manifold nature of man to one aspect, which thereby claims to become the basis and explanatory cause of the others.⁶ Lotze maintained that experience is a function of the entire man, and that it consequently possessed many attributes, many forms, and different criteria of value. His aim was to describe human nature as he found it, and to allow each part its due. To this end he weighed carefully the facts on all sides, and desired to avoid all hasty con-

¹ von Hartmann: *Lotze's Phil.*, p. 66.

² Stählin: *Kant, Lotze und Ritschl*, § 30.

³ *Moderne Philosophen*, pp. 4-5.

⁴ *Metaphysik*, § 42.

⁵ *Mikrokosmos* (Eng. trans.), II, pp. 322, ff.

⁶ Merz: Article, "Lotze:" *Ency. Brit.*, Vol. XV, p. 14.

clusions.¹ When a fact cannot be analyzed without suffering a loss of its complete nature, Lotze accepts it as ultimate.²

It is doubtless true that the various interpretations to which we have referred have some warrant. There must be something in Lotze's philosophy which is the source of such widespread interest, and of the material for so many different constructions of his system. At first sight it may seem that he has given only a partial analysis of a wide experience, and has failed to reduce it all to a system. In this way, it may be explained why Lotze has attracted so many and satisfied so few. He has touched life lightly, it may be said, but at many points. According to this view, the scope of Lotze's philosophy is the consequence of his unsystematic eclecticism. He accepts physical law and yet freedom; he enthrones feeling and will as well as reason. He will not give up the utterances of experience, and there is nothing so unimportant as to deserve no attention, or to be silenced with the charge of inconsistency with reason. Lotze lets pass no opportunity to reach a new side or aspect of truth. He moves from point to point and examines reality in its myriad phases, and in its wealth of detail. His interests are universal and his experience comprehensive. Along with the definite detail of science he brings the richness of a mature religious nature.³ This is the source of his comprehensive philosophy.

In our attempts to set forth a part of this philosophy, it ought to be remembered that it is not our purpose to maintain that there are no inconsistencies in Lotze's doctrines. Such a claim could not be substantiated. But this is no discredit to our author, for a complete system of experience which is comprehensible through and through, which compels conviction and leaves no room for doubt, has not yet been formulated, and there seems to be little likelihood that it ever will be formulated—at any rate not till all the facts of experience are in. While, however, we make no such pretensions for the perfection of Lotze's philosophy, it will be our endeavor to set forth as plainly as possible his atti-

¹ Cf. Erdmann: *Hist. of Phil.*, § 12, 347.

² *Grundriss der Metaphysik*, § 92.

³ *Mikrokosmos*, II, p. 727.

tude to philosophy, what he attempted to do towards the solution of the logical problem, and how far he has succeeded.

For the student of Lotze a difficulty soon arises. What seemed at first clear and luminous grows obscure and perplexing, and we wonder if there is any way in which the different parts can be fitted together and made comprehensible in one system. As we read on from one chapter to another, and from one book to another, the efforts we have made by the way to gather up all the threads of his doctrine, and put ourselves at his point of view, fail one by one, and we complete the first reading of his works thoroughly bewildered. It must indeed be admitted that Lotze has not given us a complete system of philosophy. He has given us an attitude and a method, and it is in this respect that we will attempt to interpret him. Furthermore, it must be granted that if we consider only the outer form of his philosophy, and do not seek to sympathetically understand his meaning, his chapters present a puzzling movement of contradictory scenes in which we may labor in vain to find unity. For example, on the one hand, an uncompromising monism is proclaimed as the only intelligible solution of the nature of reality, and, on the other hand, as decided a dualism seems to be the basis of his logical discussions. His metaphysic is monistic or idealistic, whereas his logic appears to be dualistic or realistic. This antithesis recurs again and again, and both idealism and realism are in turn urgently insisted upon. Stated in this unqualified way, Lotze's philosophy has the semblance of mere eclecticism. But we can hardly suppose that this interpretation expresses his meaning, for it would imply that he was inattentive to the most obvious contradictions. His logical doctrine seems to admit that we know only phenomena; but had Lotze meant this he could have had no legitimate right to discuss the nature of reality. It seems necessary, therefore, to qualify these statements and endeavor to comprehend the meaning that Lotze gives them. His meaning is deeper than appears on the surface, and if we can put ourselves at his point of view many of the apparent contradictions will vanish.

Sympathetic criticism a great author always deserves. When his meaning has been discovered, a more searching and destruc-

tive criticism is valuable and necessary. But until he has been interpreted, until it has been made plain what his purpose is, and how he has regarded reality, until the critic has put himself in the place of the author and has beheld reality as he beholds it, destructive and analytic criticism may be invaluable in constructing or supporting another theory, but it can not do justice to the author. Any outline of philosophy can be picked to pieces. Conceptions can be pursued to their logical conclusions and shown to contain contradictions. Such a logical criticism tends therefore to be unfair.

In this age, indeed, a great deal is said about 'consistency.' A philosophy, at least, must be consistent. Every one grants so much. But what is 'consistency,' and how do we know when a system is consistent? The moment we inquire into the meaning of this concept, which every one uses so readily, it becomes evident that our notions of 'consistency' differ, and that what is really made the criterion of truth is not consistency, but our individual conception of what consistency is. It is not easy to discover the true nature of consistency, and careful analyses do not seem to make the concept intelligible. Consistency has been defined as the principle of 'non-contradiction,' or 'the inconceivability of the opposite.' In this case, to be sure, the criterion of truth is logical or intellectual; intellect decides, and intellect alone. According to this view, feeling and emotion are disturbing elements which lead to biased judgments. If now consistency in this sense of the term is made the test of truth, it will be seen that it does not work to complete satisfaction. One of the chief characteristics of rational knowledge is that we know *how* an event occurs, *how* a compound is formed or analyzed. This 'how' is something that can be described and set forth in such a way that an observer can repeat it, and see how, as a matter of fact, the parts go together to compose the whole. We can *see* how $5 + 4 = 9$; how hydrogen and chlorine form hydrochloric acid. These processes and their results can be *shown* by analysis and synthesis. But so soon as we ask the further question as to whether we can understand how composition or unity is possible, we must admit the *fact* we know; we may even be

able to observe the parts unite together, to measure their relative proportions, and understand the synthesis to this extent. But when an attempt is made to understand how parts can form a unity, or how *a* can be *b*, it cannot be maintained dogmatically that this unity is comprehensible by means of intellect alone, though it is plain that intellect is a significant function in knowledge. If, then, the characteristic mark of intellectual knowledge is that the subject knows *how* a result is produced, or *how* a process occurs, it is probable that an intellectual comprehension of unity in difference is impossible. Individual opinion may differ widely on this point; but the very fact that there is a difference of opinion shows that intellectual consistency alone cannot be regarded as the sole criterion of truth, and of the value of knowledge. Even though it should turn out in the end to be the ultimate test of all that is comprehensible, it would be simply an unwarranted dogma to assume that all knowledge and all truth must conform to this one touch-stone.

It seems unfair, therefore, to urge to its logical conclusions certain conceptions, and make the value and results of an author's work stand or fall by the conclusions reached in this way. This further fact also must be borne in mind when a criticism of any work is made. Even though we accept the dialectic method, and hold that all concepts must be organic, and that, therefore, if any two are contradictory one or both must be false; if, I say, we accept this method, the critic is liable to fall into a common error, in that he puts his own consciousness and his own concepts in the place of those of the author whom he criticises. When a critic examines a philosophical work and finds that the concepts are not organic but self-contradictory, he may reach either one of two conclusions: Either that the writer's work is actually inconsistent, or that the concepts do not mean for the critic what they mean for the writer. Now the latter conclusion is not likely to be drawn; and so naturally the author is frequently charged with inconsistency when the real source of contradiction lies in the fact that the critic does not give his concepts the meaning which the author intended that they should express. Only a small part of one's meaning can be caught and expressed in lang-

uage ; therefore it is incumbent on all who attempt to interpret an author to get behind the mere words, to give up their own particular notions, and think *with* the writer, to get into sympathy with him, and grasp the underlying conviction which he has endeavored to designate by concepts in discursive statement. If, indeed, the critic can discover the underlying conviction, he will be able to follow the thread of connection running through the whole system, and making it an intelligible (though perhaps not an 'intellectual') unity. If, however, he misses the point of view, and seeks to construct it by an inductive synthesis, reading his own private notions into the categories, and coloring them all with his own individuality, it is patent that he will discover contradictions everywhere.

The point to be emphasized is, that the philosopher has an *attitude*, and that, to interpret him, it is necessary to get into his attitude. It is hard to realize that much of a man's philosophy is his attitude, so accustomed are we to the objectivity of natural science. In science where simple objects are *before us*, and where the problem is to count, measure, or weigh them, it is comparatively easy to treat them in an almost purely objective way. The object is simple, and appears to every one in nearly the same way, though even here we reach a limit where uniformity ceases, and individuality shapes the results. This individuality, however, here enters only in a small way, and for all practical purposes little differences can be overlooked, and all phenomena taken as uniform. Where the descriptions are easy every one agrees to them, and their objectivity is obvious. But whenever we are dealing with the personal experience of an individual thinker it is obvious that no such uniformity exists, and, indeed, there is not the same means of compelling assent. The difference, we believe, is only in degree, nevertheless there is a difference, and to recognize this is all that is demanded.

As has now been shown, knowledge has a personal equation : a man's philosophy depends largely on the kind of man he is.¹ In other words, much of our knowledge is a personal possession which is not objective, and cannot be objectified or communicated to another.² That other may be able, if he is a sympathetic

¹ Cf. Fichte, J. G., *Werke*, I, p. 434.

² *Mikr.*, II, pp. 622, 623.

critic, to reconstruct this knowledge in his own experience, and in this way become an interpreter. This he can accomplish, however, only if he beholds things from the same standpoint as the writer. Should he, indeed, be unsympathetic, and possess a conception of reality different from that of the author, then it is impossible for him to be an interpreter. Moreover, he is almost certain to observe nothing but contradictions; for he reads into the terms conceptions of his own which they will not bear. Philosophic knowledge is not simple enough to be spread out in objective perception, or to be expressed adequately in the intuitive forms of any sense department where direct perception is sufficient to compel agreement. On the contrary, this knowledge is complex, and refuses to be expressed in sensuous forms; and though it cannot be presented to the eye or the ear, it has a content and a meaning which we can appreciate, though it cannot be firmly grasped in the ordinary categories of science. This knowledge is the individual's interpretation of the infinite and boundless reality with which he is in contact. What he knows does not exhaust the wealth of reality. It is only a fragment of what can be known; but it is the part he has selected, and elaborated into an experience which is comprehensible for him. He has given this particular interpretation of reality because he was of such a nature, and stood in such a relation to reality, because it was this aspect of reality which interested him, and satisfied him. We may therefore conclude that the further the so-called world of sense is removed from our knowledge, the more the personal equation gives tone and color to the entire construction.

Our problem, therefore, will be to attempt to discover Lotze's meaning, and to appreciate what he tried to do.¹ Accordingly, this chapter will be a discussion of his problem and his method; and first we will take up his problem.

I. Lotze's problem is to reconcile oppositions, or to mediate between contrary opinions. It is a synthetic reconstruction of philosophy, which will take account of all departments of knowledge. What President Schurman says of Kant is true of Lotze: "Kant had a primitive bent towards mediation. His

¹ Cf. *Mikr.* (Eng. trans.), II, p. 576.

nature led him to compose intellectual differences by mutual concessions. His method was to recede somewhat from the rigorous and exclusive claims of either side in order to adopt the truth pertaining to both sides. . . . There was in Kant an instinctive tendency to adjudicate all disputes without rejecting the claims of rival contestants."¹ Mediation is the form philosophy took in Lotze's time, and Lotze was only one among many who attempted a reconstruction of truth. After Hegel's death a dissolution of his school occurred. The attacks upon Hegel were vital and were aimed at the very heart of his system. Accordingly, dissolution occurred in all parts of his philosophy, viz., logic, ethics, politics, and the philosophy of religion.² There was only one course open, and this was a reconstruction, and the strength of this new attitude is based upon two factors, says Kronenberg. These factors are: "The enormous development of empirical inquiry, especially in the provinces of the natural sciences, and in a negative factor, the dissolution and the disintegration of the Hegelian school."³ According to Erdmann, this reconstruction took four forms. The first was a philosophy of restoration, a return to earlier systems,⁴ while the second aimed at innovation. The members of the latter school desired to be original; but they too were really restorationists, for they produced nothing new. Some of them, says Erdmann, "had so little acquaintance with philosophy that they offered as new wisdom doctrines which had long ago been rejected."⁵ "A third case, and one which would occupy an intermediate position between these two attempts at repristination and these other attempts at giving a new form to philosophy, would occur, if one or several of the systems hitherto considered were to be taken as a starting point and further developed."⁶ This third form of reconstruction is a development of earlier systems or of an earlier system. Erdmann classifies this third form into two groups: Those who

¹ *The Critical Philosophy*, Phil. Rev., VII, I, pp. 5, 6.

² Erdmann: *op. cit.*, §§ 332-342.

³ *Moderne Philosophen*, p. 12.

⁴ Erdmann: *op. cit.*, § 344.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, § 345, I.

⁶ *Ibid.*, § 343, 2.

started either from one single system, or from a study of many systems,¹ and those who also endeavored to mediate between natural science and speculation.² To this latter class belongs Lotze. The fourth case is a retreat from philosophical systems to a study of the history of philosophy. It is the third form alone, to which Lotze belongs, which can lay claim to real originality ; for it alone is truly a *reconstruction* of former theories. This reconstruction is at the same time a mediation. Lotze endeavors to combine the truth in the various theories of philosophy with the method of the natural sciences. This was a vital problem for Lotze, who was trained in the two schools of philosophy and science. He was also a student of literature and art, and brought a well-trained mind and a high degree of culture to the solution of philosophical problems.

The tendency of Lotze's thinking is "to oppose hasty dogmatizing."³ One form of the reconciliation is that between science and faith. "It is true that the imperfection of human knowledge may compel us, when we have used our utmost endeavors, to confess that we cannot build up the results of cognition and faith so as to form a complete and perfect structure ; but we can never look on indifferently when we see cognition undermining the foundations of faith, or faith calmly putting aside as a whole that which scientific zeal has built up in detail. On the contrary, we must be ever conscious of endeavoring to maintain the rights of each, and to show how far from insoluble is the contradiction in which they appear to be inextricably involved."⁴ Now what is true of the relation of man's spiritual needs to the results of science, is true of every department of Lotze's philosophy. He mediates between the creation conception of the origin of the world and the conception of development. For Lotze, God is not a *Deus ex machina* who declares his will in miracles. On the contrary, he manifests himself in the laws of nature.⁵ This leads to the mediation between mechanism and teleology. God

¹ *Op. cit.*, § 346, I.

² *Ibid.*, § 347, 9.

³ *Ibid.*, §§ 347, 12.

⁴ *Mikr.*, I, Introd., p. xi.; cf. also Kronenberg : *op. cit.*, pp. 19-21 ; Jones : *op. cit.*, ch. I; Lindsay : *Hermann Lotze : Mind*, 1876, p. 369.

⁵ *Mikr.*, II, p. 128.

works in nature. The telic purpose of the universe operates by means of a mechanical system. Teleology has a *modus operandi*. Therefore pure mechanism is an abstraction, and not an ultimate or metaphysical category.¹ But teleology alone is equally an abstraction and only a methodological conception, or *Hilfsbegriff* which enables us to group certain aspects of reality under a definite rubric.² Both concepts are limited, and both imply one another. Mechanism is therefore no power controlling reality, but rather the way in which a purposeful reality realizes itself.³ Again we find the same philosophical problem in Lotze's discussion of monism and pluralism. An absolute monism would contradict experience, which asserts a many, and also change. On the other hand, pluralism is not ultimate; for experience testifies to the unity of reality. Furthermore, neither of these concepts can logically stand alone. Each implies the other. Unity has no meaning without plurality, and plurality has no meaning apart from unity. The real, Lotze therefore concludes, is one and many, it is a unity of differences. Once more, this tendency to mediate between extremes is found not only in the critique of these higher categories, but is present throughout all Lotze's work.⁴ He breaks down the abstract distinction between physics and physiology, or between the inorganic⁵ and the organic; also the distinction between plants and animals;⁶ and body and mind.⁷ There is still another and very important case in which this method is exemplified. Lotze has acted the part of mediator with regard to the notions of appearance and reality. Since Kant's time these concepts have been of vital importance for a theory of knowledge. Appearance and reality were so regarded that a sharp dualism arose between the two, with the result that appearance is known and reality unknown. A little later the attempt to know a reality behind appearance was renounced, and appearance and reality were identified, and thus, of course,

¹ *Met.*, § 269.

² *Ibid.*, § 92.

³ *Mikr.*, II, pp. 620 f; *Logic*, §§ 147 ff.

⁴ *Met.*, §§ 68-81; *Grundriss der Religionsphil.*, § 21; *Mikr.*, II, pp. 594-599.

⁵ *Mikr.*, Bk. I, Chs. II,-IV; *Allgemeine Pathologie*, Bk. I.

⁶ *Medizinische Psychologie*, §§ 11-15.

⁷ *Med. Psy.*, §§ 6-10; *Mikr.*, Bk., III.

reality is known when appearance is known. Lotze, however, does not accept either of these extreme theories, but adopts a position which preserves the truth in both.

Not only do Lotze's sympathetic interpreters admit that mediation plays an important rôle in his philosophic thinking, and commend him for this method, but his opponents equally observe how large a part this method has in shaping his philosophy. This method is plainly acknowledged, for example, by Jones¹ and Lange. The latter extols Lotze for the distinct service he has rendered to science in clearing up the problem, and in providing a method, while condemning him for what Lange considers a return to superstition.² In another reference to Lotze, Lange says: "An example of such a scientific police was furnished some years ago by Lotze in his polemic against the anthropology of the younger Fichte. He made only one mistake, that after he had scientifically quite defeated him he proposed to shake hands and exchange gifts like the Homeric heroes."³

There are still a few points concerning mediation which we need to notice before closing this section. Mediation is not a mechanical adjudication by means of which an arithmetic mean is obtained, through each side "yielding a little alternatively," but it is a reinterpretation of the facts, a rethinking of them in new concepts. It is plainly a fresh elaboration of the facts of experience, and in this respect it differs from an eclecticism. In the second place, mediation does not remove all differences, and unite oppositè theories and facts on the dead-level of bare identity; but it takes note of differences, and seeks to emphasize them to their full value. Lotze is always opposed to hasty generalization, and regards it as no advance when unity is won at the loss of content. Wherever the unity underlying two different contents is not clearly known, Lotze regards a generalization unwarranted, and prefers to designate each content by its own concept. As will be seen below, he regards such contents as methodologically distinct, though he admits that ultimately they form a unity in a way which at present is not understood. But in this prin-

¹ *Op. cit.*, Ch. I.

² Cf. *Hist. of Materialism* (Eng. Trans.), Vol. II, p. 285.

³ *Ibid.*, II, p. 347.

ciple of mediation it is maintained that these opposite contents are not dualistically opposed, and are not incompatible. With this notion the metaphysical problem is solved, and the remaining task devolves upon one or other of the special sciences to show in detail how the mediation is accomplished. Thirdly, the request that philosophy explain *how* the general concepts are formed, and how reality exists as it does exist is far too great a demand. Because we can maintain that reality is a unity in difference, it does not follow that an explanation of *how* this is so can be given. Knowledge is broader than intellectual explanation. Many things are known where an explanation of them is not forthcoming. Mediation in Lotze's hands is rather an insistence on the facts wherever they are found. It holds to them in the hope that further reflection will display their interdependence. Meanwhile it tones down opposing theories by regarding them as human formulations of certain bodies of facts, or as *Hilfshypothesen*; and by giving, wherever possible, a reinterpretation, so that the truth on both sides is retained, and both explained. The philosopher must not be over-enthusiastic for the great things, and regardless of the small. Each has its worth in the unity of things and it should be treated as it deserves.¹ No theory therefore has any right to tyrannize over the facts, and "any scientific hypothesis that offends our deeper instincts is *ipso facto* disproved, and classed among those materialistic theories that far outrun possible experience."²

II. Lotze's method is the key to all his philosophy. Philosophy, he maintains, is not a deductive science, and knowledge cannot be deduced *a priori* from any general principle. Not only can knowledge in its detail not be deduced, but not even an outline can be given *a priori*. "One view, however, believes that it is both able and obliged to divine at the beginning the One Real Principle, on which the world actually depends, and from it to deduce or construe the entire actuality as the sum of its consequences. Such a beginning for cognition would be the best if we were gods. On the contrary, as finite beings, we do not our-

¹ *Mikr.*, II, p. 728.

² Santayana: *Lotze's Moral Idealism*: Mind, Vol. XV (1890), p. 191.

selves stand in the creative center of the world, but eccentrically in the hurly-burly of its individual sequences. It is not at all probable, and is never certain, that we should perfectly divine the one true principle of the world in any one fundamental thought, however noble and important, to which some sudden intuition might lead us; still more uncertain that we should formally apprehend it so accurately that the series of its true consequences should obviously proceed from it. It is rather altogether probable that the first expression of the principle will be defective, and that mistakes will always multiply in the course of the deduction; since one has regard to no independent point of view from which they might be corrected.”¹

The deductive method is of value for the *exhibition* of a truth already possessed. But since it can only exhibit truth, it is not a suitable method for the discovery of truth and the comprehension of reality. Man's business is the *search for truth*, and his method must be able to aid him in its discovery. Man is only an atom in the vast universe, and it is idle for him to endeavor to grasp the complete truth of the universe from which he can deduce all secondary truth.² Man's importance has been overestimated. He still bears too much of the celestial dignity with which the illumination has crowned him. Man may be made in the likeness of God, but he is not a deity, and he has no right to claim omniscience. Instead of residing in the center of things from which he can see reality in its completeness, he exists on the periphery of being, and has only a little knowledge, and this is relative to his station, and has been acquired gradually.³ If God *is* truth, it is, on the other hand, man's duty to attain truth. Consequently “the mere *search for truth* is by no means under the necessity of taking its point of departure from one principle, but is justified in setting forth from many points of attachment that lie near each other. It is only bound to the laws of thought—beyond that, to no so-called ‘method’ whatever.”⁴

¹ *Encyk. d. Phil.*, § 3.

² *Mikr.*, II, p. 141.

³ *Logik.*, Introd., § ix.

⁴ *Encyk. d. Phil.*, § 3; *Mikr.*, II, pp. 714, 715.

Furthermore, deduction is a purely intellectual method, and bases every step in the process upon pure concepts. If complete knowledge deifies man, the deductive method of philosophy deifies intellect. This deification of reason is the heritage we have received from the French and German Illumination. The supremacy of intellect is expressed by Sir W. Hamilton in his famous aphorism: "In the world there is nothing great but man. In man there is nothing great but mind." This conception of man makes intellect sovereign, and the rest of his nature a slave. Feeling, emotion, and desire have no rights. As Kant states it, they have only duties to reason. Feeling must always give way to intellect; emotion is a form of feeling which is very disturbing and threatens the supremacy of reason: It is simply a rash, and rank growth of feeling.¹ This method endeavors to rationalize everything, to express all experience in terms of intellect, and what does not conform to this criterion is erroneous. Be this as it may, it is a point of view against which Lotze wages an incessant polemic. "It is by Lotze chiefly that the overestimation of knowledge has been demolished, a notion which has haunted our conceptions of life from Plato to Hegel. In theoretical thought, indeed, Lotze refers to the elements of belief in immediate experiences, which lie in the ultimate axioms, and consequently he shows the deeper significance which belongs to belief in the unity of the soul."² So far from being able to deduce all reality in concepts from one universal principle, thought alone is not able to comprehend many of the ordinary facts of experience. Becoming is a puzzle for thought, so also are causation, existence, unity, etc.³ Reality can be understood only by living it in every part of our being, and not by thought only. Could it be understood by thought, and unfolded from one principle as concepts can be analyzed from a judgment, then *reality* would *be* thought. But "the nature of things does not consist in thoughts, and . . . thinking is not able to grasp it. . . . It was a long time before living fancy recognized in thought the bridle which guides the course, steadily, surely, and truly; per-

¹ Kant: *Werke* (Hartenstein's Ed.), Vol. VII, pp. 571 ff.

² Vorbrodt: *Principien d. Ethik*, p. 9.

³ *Mikr.*, II, pp. 353-355.

haps it will be as long again before men see that the bridle cannot originate the motion which it should guide."¹ Man, however, is more than intellect. He is feeling, will, emotion, as well. He is a spirit with its complex life, and logic is not sufficient to explain him, or the world to which he belongs. "Reality is infinitely richer than thought."² Since reality is of this spiritual nature "the like over-estimate of logical principles, the habit of regarding them as limitations of what is really possible, would oblige us to treat as inadmissible the most important assumptions on which our conception of the world is founded."³ From these and other considerations Lotze concludes that the method of philosophy is not a *a priori* deduction.

Lotze's criticism of the method of a *a priori* deduction has been misunderstood. It has been regarded as a hostile attack on idealism, and this notion has gained ground largely, I believe, from the circumstance that his philosophy has been called a realism. This criticism, however, is not well founded, and is based upon a misunderstanding of his use of terms, and of his method, in that his method has been confused with his general view of the world. An example of this kind of criticism is seen in the following passage: "Lotze's opposition to Idealism was not based so much on his antagonism to its positive doctrines, as upon his antipathy to its *system*. To the essentially critical spirit of Lotze a system . . . seems to tyrannize over its component parts . . . His philosophy is a persistent defence of perception against reflection, of the concrete particular against pale and vacant general ideas."⁴ The point of this criticism is: 'Because idealism is a system, and because a system tyrannizes over its parts, Lotze rejects idealism.' That this is false will be seen later. But we may say here that Lotze does not object to idealism; he is well aware that reality is a system, and regards this as its merit: further, he would say that reality as a system does not tyrannize over its parts. Nevertheless, he does maintain that the idealism of the schools, since *it* is a system, does tyrannize over the parts. Let us now endeavor to discover what Lotze means, and wherein the criticism fails.

¹ *Mikr.*, II, pp. 559, 560; *Met.*, § 93.

² *Met.*, § 76; Cf. also §§ 83, 88.

³ *Ibid.*, § 77.

⁴ Jones: *op. cit.*, p. 9.

Lotze's denial of the *a priori* method is only a modest confession that man is not omniscient, and must renounce all claims to divine knowledge. It is only a confession of limited knowledge, and not a profession of skepticism; nor does it sound the knell of idealism as has been asserted. Lotze's position is put strongly in the following passage: "Only a mind which stood at the center of the real world, not outside individual things, but penetrating them with its presence, could command such a view of reality as left nothing to look for, and was therefore the perfect image of it in its own being and activity. But the human mind, with which alone we are here concerned, does not thus stand at the center of things, but has a modest position somewhere in the extreme ramifications of reality."¹ The difference between an omniscient mind and the human consciousness is that the knowledge of the former is all-inclusive, and beholds things from the center, whereas the knowledge of the latter is fragmentary (partially-inclusive), and beholds things from the periphery. Complete and partial knowledge, however, do not differ radically, though they differ in degree of perfection, and in degree of unity. They are more or less alike in structure and content, and possess the same purpose. What Lotze says, therefore, is that human *knowledge* about reality is incomplete and fragmentary: that this knowledge cannot be deduced from a general principle, for this would imply the complete knowledge which is desired. Further, the philosophical system which desires to grasp first of all the ultimate principle of the universe, and grasp it completely, and then unfold out of it all knowledge, makes pretences for human cognition which there is no warrant to allow. Lotze only denies that there is an *a priori* deduction of knowledge from a general principle, that human knowledge is complete, and a system. Never does he deny or even doubt the validity of knowledge. He is not skeptical. He believes in the attainability of knowledge. Again, Lotze in his reflections on the limitations of human knowledge does not say a word about reality. That knowledge is incomplete does not imply that reality is incomplete. In all these discussions about the limitations of knowledge, we must ever bear

¹ *Logik*, Introd., § IX.

in mind that Lotze has reference to knowledge and knowledge only. He is not discussing reality.

With this conception of the nature of Lotze's problem, let us return to the objection mentioned above. It was said that Lotze rejects idealism on account of the tyranny of its system. This criticism is guilty of a confusion. It confuses knowledge and reality. It makes a *system of knowledge* identical with a *system of reality*. If, however, these two concepts are regarded interchangeably, Lotze deserves the above criticism; for he denies, as has been shown, that our knowledge is a system. It does not all hang on one complete and all-including major premise which contains in itself all that we know or can possibly know. According to this criticism, our knowledge is not a system, reality is knowledge, therefore reality is not a system, or a unity. Thus it is concluded that Lotze's conception of reality is a pluralism, and not idealism. If, however, the distinction between a system of reality or idealism, and a system of knowledge is maintained, then this objection is answered. Lotze may very well deny that we possess a system of knowledge, and at the same time hold that reality is a unity, and ideal. Now just this is Lotze's position. Knowledge is not a system, but reality is a system. Ontologically the world is a single spiritual being; and if it could be known completely, this unity would be known, and the function of every part fully comprehended.¹ But such complete knowledge no human being has, and, consequently, there is no system of knowledge about reality. When, however, knowledge is taken to be a system, and the parts of experience forcibly fitted into its categories, the system does tyrannize over the parts. The system of knowledge is the tyranny; but reality, on the other hand, is a system. This conception of knowledge as fragmentary, and its relation to reality which is a system, is clearly stated by Hobhouse: "Broadly we may say that the function of thought in inference is to connect the given with the result of extending its knowledge over the wider reality which is not given. In the act of inference thought takes the actual relation as also a necessary relation, and as a fragment of neces-

¹ *Logik*, § 300.

sary relations. In this mode of functioning, thought has no system ready made, no criterion of necessity lying at hand to apply. It learns the concrete character of the system from the facts themselves, and hence by slow and laborious degrees with constant mistakes. Its only postulate is that there is a system ; there are relations which are necessary. What the system is it must find out from the facts themselves.”¹

Though Lotze repudiates the attempt to deduce our knowledge from some one general principle, such as the Idea, he does not go to the opposite extreme and proclaim that such a procedure has no meaning at all.² On the contrary, he sees what meaning there is in it, and gladly admits its value. So far as this method recognizes the unity of the world, it keeps before the philosopher an ideal.³ It is a regulative principle which means that all knowledge aims at unity, and should aim at unity. Nevertheless, this unity must never be used as a principle of explanation from which new truth can be deduced. Every such attempt to begin with the idea is a *petitio principii*, for it is only through the knowledge of particulars that we can attain the knowledge of general truth. Knowledge begins with experience and rises gradually to more comprehensive insight.⁴ Notwithstanding this truth that we must advance in knowledge by the slow and plodding way of experience, an ideal outruns our actual knowledge, and is in a measure its formative principle, and determines its worth.⁵

The critical method of Locke and Kant is an aspect of a *a priori* deduction. This method makes a systematic enquiry into the capacity of the human mind for the attainment of knowledge. According to it the first problem is to find a theory of knowledge which shall make clear the extent and limitations of human knowledge. Locke and some friends were discussing a problem, and reached only bewildering difficulties. “After we had awhile puzzled ourselves,” he says, “without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my

¹ *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 475.

² *Logik*, §§ 322-333.

³ *Ibid.*, § 365.

⁴ *Met.*, § 93 ; Erdmann : *op. cit.*, § 347, II.

⁵ Cf. *Mikr.*, I, pp. 675 ff, 685.

thoughts that we took a wrong course, and that before we set ourselves upon enquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with."¹ Modest as this method may seem, it is as dogmatic as the method it supplants. Reason cannot once for all determine what is knowable, and what is unknowable. "There is something," says Lotze, "convenient and seductive in the plan of withdrawing attention from the solution of definite questions, and applying oneself to general questions in regard to cognitive capacities, of which any one *could* avail himself who set seriously about it. In fact, however, the history of science shows that those who resolutely set themselves to mastering certain problems generally found that their cognizance of the available appliances and of the use of them grew keener in the process; while, on the other hand, the pretentious occupation with theories of cognition has seldom led to any solid result. It has not itself created those methods which it entertains itself with exhibiting but not employing. On the contrary, it is the actual problems that have compelled the discovery of the methods by which they are solved. The constant whetting of the knife is tedious, if it is not proposed to cut anything with it."² We cannot discover or prove by reason that reason is capable or incapable of knowledge. Instinctively or immediately we trust in the unity of reality and set about its disclosure, believing that we are able to accomplish somewhat of the task.³

The first form of explanation seeks to explain a fact by deducing it from some general principle. But there is another kind of explanation which explains a fact by *constructing* it. This method Lotze also rejects, not completely, however, for he gives it a methodological function in so far as it is useful in detecting the elements or aspects of the nature of any object or process. This mode of explanation may be called the *analytico-synthetic* method. According to it anything is accounted for when it has been analyzed into its constituents, and when, these elements be-

¹ *Essay: The Epistle to the Reader.*

² *Met.* Introd., § IX; *Logik*, § 322; Cf. Hegel: *Encyk.*, §§, 10, 41; *Werke*, VI, pp. 15-17; 85-89; Seth, A., *Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 90.

³ Cf. Tuch: *Lotze's Stellung z. Occasionalismus*, p. 1.

ing again put together, the thing arises in its true nature. One example will make this plain : The process of becoming has been subjected to this method, and an effort made to analyze it into its elements. As it stands the category is not understood, and the labor of centuries has been spent on attempts to analyze it. For a few years the analysis seemed to have been attained when Hegel imagined he was able to give the synthesis of becoming. It is composed of two elements, he said, being and non-being. In separation these constituents are static, united into a compound, fluid. Plausible, however, as this theory may seem, Lotze opposes it strenuously, and declares that the matter is not really explained at all. Of becoming, he maintains, "we can never put it together out of its component parts, for it has none. The labor expended upon this impossible aim always ends in a vicious circle, since among the materials that are to be used in the construction the very thing that was to be constructed is taken for granted, however much it may be concealed under strange expressions. Thus, for example, in our idea of *becoming* the two ideas of being and not-being are no doubt united as two connected points of relation ; but if we should try to characterize becoming as the unity of the two we should not attain our object."¹ There is no use in attempting to define a thing, or to get at its essence by its construction out of parts. Such a method may be able to discover what a compound is composed of, but it cannot express what the thing is. This objection is as old as Plato,² and Aristotle. To use Aristotle's language, the material cause alone is not adequate to explain anything. Furthermore, 'becoming' is only one instance in which knowledge is broader than intellectual understanding. We can *know* many things which we cannot *understand*—in the sense that they can be constructed out of elements. As was seen above, intellect desires to "picture the ultimate facts of reality" and show *how* they fit together to form objects.³ Knowledge, indeed, does not end here. Much of experience defies such analysis. We can live these experiences,

¹ *Logik*, §. 159.

² Cf. *Theætetus*, 207, 208.

³ Cf. *Gr. d. Religionsphil.*, § 21.

but cannot explain them.¹ Not only does analysis fail to explain some of the more subtle parts of experience, but it is insufficient to explain anything at all. It is only part of the explanation, and as a part it is indispensable, but it must not be taken for the complete explanation. The material cause alone can never be the full explanation of any fact. As an example, the equation $a + b = c$ may be taken. In this equation c is analyzed into a and b . And when a and b are related so that the quantities they represent are added together their sum is equal to c . But how $a + b$ can be equal to c is not explained; for while the two sides of the equation are numerically equal, they are not identical, otherwise there would be no equation.² This shows that this method is not adequate for philosophy; and where it is used, it gives only imperfect results.

The method is valuable, however, only its results must not be taken as final. Like the method of *a priori* deduction it has a methodological use; and its conclusions must be reinterpreted in connection with our broader experience. All that analysis can accomplish is to find out the conspicuous aspects of an object, and direct attention to these. It may be that some characteristic aspect will be isolated, an aspect by which it can be marked, named, and recognized, when it appears again. The analysis however has not manifested the living tissue of the thing. "Reality is richer than thought, nor can thought make reality after it. The fact of becoming was enough to convince us that there is such a thing as a union of being and not-being, which we are not able to reconstruct in thought, even when it lies before us, much less could have guessed at it if it had not been presented to us."³ When analysis has done its best, it has resolved an object, *e. g.*, a lemon into certain tastes, odors, colors, pressure sensations, etc., but it has not exhausted the nature of the lemon. And suppose this analysis could continue and discover more qualities, we would be no nearer a knowledge of how these qualities *form, or are aspects of*, the lemon. The fact that we do not know how to state

¹ Cf. *Mikr.*, II, pp. 662, 663; *Met.*, § 47.

² *Logik*, §§ 350-364.

³ *Met.*, § 47.

the relation of quality and object is a convincing argument that neither thought nor scientific analysis or synthesis is competent to construct an object. This method must always be accompanied by a reconstruction and a remodeling of its results.¹

III. So far it has been seen that the various methods and concepts must be limited, supplemented, and reinterpreted. This use of concepts is methodological. By a methodological concept is meant a device or regulative principle by means of which the human mind seeks to make intelligible a group of facts. Any body of knowledge possesses only methodological concepts, and does not provide a final or complete explanation of things. All our concepts express a certain aspect of reality; they help the mind to comprehend things, but in no case are they complete or final. They are *Hilfsbegriffe*. For this reason they are partially true, and to a certain extent report reality correctly. It has been said that nothing corresponds to them in the nature of things; that they are merely subjective. But if this were Lotze's meaning, then they would not be concepts conveying knowledge; they would be nothing but fictions. They are human ways of understanding reality, to be sure, but as man is a part of reality, these concepts are objective as well as subjective. Since man belongs to reality, it is not possible for him to think and know in a purely subjective, *i. e.*, in a purely arbitrary, way.² Yet he is only a *part* of reality, and cannot therefore behold things in the way the deity sees them. His knowledge is for this reason incomplete; it is methodological.

A striking illustration of the methodological use of concepts is seen in Lotze's examination of life. In the first place he finds that to a "great extent" "life employs for the execution of its functions the same means by which human mechanical skill produces its works."³ This mechanism holds not only of the lower, but also of the higher forms of life.⁴ Nevertheless, the phenomena of consciousness demand a higher category than that of mechanism.⁵ The consequence is that mental and bodily phenomena cannot be grouped under the same rubric. Now, bodily and mental phe-

¹ *Mikr.*, II, p. 141.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, p. 137.

² *Logik*, § 359; *Met.*, §§ 90, 94.

⁵ *Met.*, § 269.

³ *Mikr.*, I, p. 120.

nomena do not belong to two absolutely distinct spheres, but are ultimately one.¹ Lotze, however, prefers to use different categories, each best suited for its own facts. Since, now, all reality is ultimately one, if the concept of mechanism completely explained the corporeal phenomena, then this concept would be constitutive, and would also account for mental phenomena. But it does not adequately explain corporeal facts. It is a *Hilfsbegriff*, used to classify a definite group of phenomena. Mental phenomena differ widely from bodily, so a new concept is necessary. This also is a methodological concept. Our limited knowledge does not show us how all things form a unity; and consequently it would be only a false craving for unity that would at once merge the sharp contrast between these two concepts in something higher. While we do not know the unity, we must hold our concepts apart and keep them distinct, though in reality the things denoted by them belong to a unity.² Again the methodological nature of his conception of the relation of body and soul is striking. Our knowledge does not warrant the concept of causal relation. For this relation, therefore, Lotze uses the concept of occasionalism. This concept is not a metaphysical doctrine. On the contrary, it provides a means of thinking the relation of body and soul, a means which is fairly adequate to the facts as now known. As such it is useful; as a metaphysical conception it is of no value.³

This recognition of the methodological nature of concepts may be called the critical method; for it calls in question the right of transferring finite ways of thinking to reality. The investigator who is not aware that his concepts are in process of formation, that they are human ways of comprehending reality, and therefore only partially true, being limited to a narrow field of thought, is the real dogmatist. The critical philosopher, on the other hand, is he who is conscious of the imperfection of the principles he uses, is aware of their limited application, and knows that they

¹ *Met.*, §§ 247-252; *Mikr.*, Bk. III.

² *Mikr.*, I, p. 167.

³ *Med. Psy.*, pp. 76, 77. Cf., also Tuch: *op. cit.*, pp. 20, 21. The importance of methodological concepts is clearly seen in the discussion on the nature of a thing. *Met.*, § 94.

represent only one aspect of things. Consequently, he will not extend their use, nor will he regard them as the constitutive principles of reality. In other words he will not regard his concepts as identical with the concepts which would be used by an omniscient being. He admits that his knowledge is to some extent his own way of comprehending things, and regards it as only partially objective. In other words his categories are methodological and not constitutive principles.

IV. Wherever an empirical method is used, an important element in determining what is true and what is false, is *utility*. The hypothesis or category that works well is adopted, and the one which works ill is put aside. Man is not yet ready for a pure logic which will enable him to determine the value of every principle and concept by means of an analysis of the Idea. His pursuits are in a far humbler sphere, and he must take a zig-zag road, following at times happy intuitions, and again wandering on an illusory quest. It is only when the mountain top is reached that he can obtain the complete view.¹ All the way up, to be sure, he gets a partial prospect, or a part of the truth.² To continue the figure: the survey from the summit gives constitutive categories, that from the sides, and base, methodological. Though, indeed, pure logic lays bare and brings into consciousness the ultimate principles and the ideal which is implicit in all thinking, it can only provide regulative principles. The whole content, however, of these principles, and the particular laws and concepts in our actual knowledge are derived from a careful analysis of experience. Pure logic, or dialectic, is on the other hand, an evaluation of experience, and not its basis. It is a reflection on experience in which the categories are already present.³ The dialectic schema, however, is of no aid in discovery except as a regulative principle. But discovery is man's first task. He is met by myriads of facts which he has simply to accept, and group in the way that will best aid memory, and the disclosure of new facts. The *goal* is a complete system of knowledge "but the different peculiarities of different objects offer resistance to this

¹ *Logik*, § 345.

² *Mikr.*, I I, pp. 334 f.

³ *Logik*, §§ 191-196; Cf. Seth: *Hegelianism and Personality*, Ch. III.

arrangement; it is not clear of itself what sum of matter has a claim to form a determinate concept and be opposed to another, or which predicate belongs universally to which subject, or how the universal law for the arrangement of manifold material is to be discovered. Applied logic is concerned with those methods of *investigation* which obviate these defects. It considers hindrances and the devices by which they may be overcome; and it must therefore sacrifice the love of systematization to considerations of utility, and select what the experience of science has so far shown to be important and fruitful."¹

The laws and hypotheses by means of which knowledge is built up are at first tentative guesses "on the part of the imagination, made possible by a knowledge of facts,"² which have received confirmation by their explanation of the facts.³ They also receive confirmation by extending beyond the immediate facts, which they were introduced to explain, so as to lead to the discovery of new facts. Now a question may arise: "How do we know that such and such a law is the only one valid for the series and true?" Lotze answers that there is no *a priori* justification of any law, or any deductive confirmation of its truth. Its only justification is its capability to explain the facts of experience for which purpose it was invented. "There is no process of demonstration by which we can find such a law, none by which it could be shown to be what it claims to be. We can never do more than guess at the law, and then by the help of innumerable secondary considerations heighten the probability of its being the true one."⁴

Notwithstanding Lotze's treatment of the deductive method, his own procedure has not escaped criticism. According to Krebs, Lotze distinguishes two kinds of truth.⁵ One is immediate and indemonstrable, resting on self-evidence, the other is derived from this immediate truth. The former truths neither

¹ *Logik*, Introd., § XII; Cf. also, *Mikr.*, II, pp. 326, 343; Merz: Article *Lotze* in *Ency. Brit.*, Vol. XV, p. 14.

² *Logik*, § 269.

³ *Ibid.*, § 273.

⁴ *Ibid.*, § 269.

⁵ *Die Wissenschaftsbegriff bei Hermann Lotze*, V. f. w. Ph., Vol. XXI, p. 33 ff.

need nor are capable of proof, the latter are logically demonstrated from the self-evident truths. Krebs, therefore, maintains that Lotze's logical criterion of truth must be supplemented by the conception that truth proves itself in the course of enquiry. But so far as I can understand Lotze, this criticism is not just. Further, the method which Krebs recommends is Lotze's own method, as has been seen. Lotze's method is not deductive, and he does not derive the truths of science from general self-evident principles in the way in which Krebs maintains. To be sure, he does use self-evident principles; but the above criticism has misunderstood the use he makes of them. While Lotze uses the empirical method, he is not a mere empiricist, but always recognizes the need of ultimate principles. The mind for him is not a passive spectator of existence. It does not mirror reality, but interprets it. For this reason it requires principles of interpretation, which are ideal forms that the mind instinctively strives to realize. They are vague glimmers of the ultimate synthesis.¹ These forms are the modes in which the mind knows, and without them there could be no knowledge.² Self-evident truths are the categories of thought—the laws of identity and causation,³ unity in difference,⁴ intuitive forms of space and time.⁵ Now it is evident that these truths are not knowledge from which other knowledge can be deduced. They are, rather, modes of mental activity or synthesis which are immediately admitted to be necessary forms of knowing.⁶ From the law of identity, unaided by experience, nothing can be inferred.⁷ Causation without a content is empty. It possesses only hypothetical necessity. "None of these necessary truths reveals to us what is; as universal laws they speak only of that which must be if something else is; they show us what inevitably follows from conditions the occurrence

¹ *Logik*, §§ 348–365.

² *Ibid.*, §§ 322–333; *Met.*, §§ 267–274; *Mikr.*, I, pp. 220–239; Cf. also Kant's Deduction of the Categories.

³ *Mikr.*, I, p. 671.

⁴ *Logik*, §§ 356, 363 ff.

⁵ *Mikr.*, I, p. 226.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 226 ff; 668 ff; *Met.*, § 99.

⁷ *Logik*, §§ 352–361.

of which they leave wholly doubtful.¹ Therefore, it can be concluded that these immediate truths are not used by Lotze as major premises from which all scientific knowledge is deduced logically. Since, however, Lotze employs self-evident truth in this restricted sense,² let us see if he uses this species of innate knowledge as a major premise. An example of this truth is mathematics. This kind of truth, indeed, is not discovered by pure thought, but depends upon experience.³ Each step is based upon a perception, and is not derived from the preceding as from a major premise. For these reasons Lotze does not regard science as a body of *a priori* knowledge resting upon one or several fundamental principles.⁴ On the contrary, he maintains that all knowledge is obtained by means of empirical methods—methods, however, guided by the soul's deeper nature which being a unity endeavors to interpret experience as ultimately a unity, and being an end naturally interprets reality in terms of a final unity towards which it strives.

But it may be said that methodology belongs to scientific method only, and that it does not have anything to do with immediate truth. This immediate truth is claimed to rest on a different basis, and to have a validity independent of all experience. But again we must keep to the spirit of Lotze, if we mean to interpret him. Innate truth is not privileged, and in a strict sense is not truth at all, but rather a form of truth. Knowledge depends upon innate ideas. This, indeed, gives them no sanctity for the *a posteriori* element is just as necessary. Knowledge implies toil.⁵ Innate ideas are "nothing but habits of action,"⁶; but they do not exist ready-made in the mind.⁷ Each, on the contrary, has been evolved. It is what it is, and can do what it does because it has been instructed thus by the press of circumstances.⁸ What is true of innate ideas in the intellectual world

¹ *Mikr.*, II, p. 575.

² *Logik*, § 357.

³ *Ibid.*, §§ 352, 358.

⁴ *Cf.* § 2.

⁵ *Logik*, §§ 322-333.

⁶ *Mikr.*, I, p. 669.

⁷ *Logik*, § 9.

⁸ *Cf. Mikr.*, I, pp. 227 ff; *Logik*, § 324.

is true of ethical ideals in the moral cosmos.¹ To have innate ideas is simply to possess the capacity of knowing. The *particular* innate ideas a man uses depends on his mental constitution² and also on his environment.³ The soul as such *knows*, and this may be its so-called instinct, but it knows and meets the real world with modes of activity which become increasingly definite with experience.⁴ Thus it is obvious that innate truth is only the form of all truth, and can be no less methodological than the more definite concepts. All alike are human ways of interpreting reality⁵; and, as has been shown, an important aspect of the criterion of truth is its ability to fit in with other truths and assist in their explanation.

V. The failure to understand Lotze's methodological point of view and his notion of the criterion of truth, has been the occasion of much unfair criticism. Many of his critics cannot understand an idealism which is realistic in method. They regard idealism as a systematic deduction of all knowledge (or sometimes of all reality) from a general principle. Idealism is taken to be synonymous with 'system' in the Hegelian sense of the term. But as has been shown (II) the term 'system' has two meanings, a metaphysical and a logical. The former refers to the nature of the world, and the latter to knowledge about the world. Now only a complete and perfect system of knowledge can show how the world emanates from the idea. Man's knowledge is not, however, a system except in a very limited sense. Notwithstanding, however, Lotze's clear and decided conviction on this point, Caspari maintains that he should have constructed a system of knowledge. In summing up his criticism of Lotze's philosophy, he says that Lotze's service consists more in acute suggestions than in its systematic results, and that he has not thought out the relations in which individual things stand to the Idea.⁶ Achelis raises the same objection, maintaining that Lotze does not explain in a satisfactory manner the origin of existences emerging from the being of the Absolute, and that furthermore he does not

¹ Cf. *Mikr.*, II, p. 226.

⁴ *Ibid.*, § 324.

² *Ibid.*, I, p. 669.

⁵ Cf. *Met.*, §§ 94, 99.

³ *Logik*, § 9.

⁶ *Hermann Lotze in Stellung z. Gesch. d. Phil.*

get beyond the theory of preëstablished harmony.¹ All these criticisms regard philosophy as a *system* of knowledge, and do not distinguish methodology from a constitutive use of the categories.

In conclusion, it may be said that methodology is the key to Lotze's philosophy. Human knowledge is not an organic *system*, and cannot be such. It is impossible to see how our experience all fits together into an harmonious whole. At best human knowledge consists of many little fragments into which the special scientists are laboring to induce order. But a *science* of the whole is still far off. We may have, it is true, a science of the whole *in outline only*; but such a science is rather a demand for, and a faith in, the unity which is not yet known. Now philosophy can be little more than this demand for and belief in the unity which is not yet known. It is more than this, however, in that philosophy endeavors to make this demand and belief consistent with the facts of experience. Compared with experience, philosophical knowledge is a science in mere outline, and does not provide an ultimate principle from which experience can be deduced. The best scientific theory is capable only within limits of being the premise from which knowledge can be derived. Much less, indeed, can philosophical first principles serve for the deduction of knowledge. Lotze, therefore, maintains that the *a priori* method is useless for philosophy. On the contrary, he holds that all enquiry must follow the empirical method. The *quest of knowledge* must always proceed from experience to laws and concepts, and not from general principles to the facts of experience. This quest, therefore, necessarily groups its facts in various ways, adopting those forms of synthesis which serve best for the matter in hand. But another enquirer with different purposes, or perhaps even with the same purpose, would have arranged them differently, and would have given a different meaning to his concepts. Again, different parts of the field differ widely, though all belong together. Now when this is the case, and when the investigator does not know how the various parts all belong organically to one unity, he distinguishes the different

¹ Lotze's *Phil.*, V. f. w., Ph., 1882. Cf. also, Stählin: *Kant, Lotze and Ritschl* (Eng. trans.), pp. 118-128.

functions by means of categories which are partially or even totally exclusive. It is better to emphasize the characteristic of each, even at the cost of distinguishing them completely, than to lose the characteristic in general conceptions which aim at covering both groups of facts. Such limitations, however, belong to finite knowledge alone. A perfect intelligence would have no such limitations. For such an intelligence each category would denote its object-system, not emphasizing any one characteristic, but giving every aspect its actual value. Consequently the categories of complete knowledge would form a system, just as reality which is known thereby, is a system. In such a case the categories would be constitutive. With human knowledge, as has been shown, it is very different. The concepts do not form a system. Each has grasped only an aspect and has emphasized that. Compared, therefore, with complete categories human concepts are distortions, one-sided, and in need of qualification. This limitation of concepts Lotze denominates by the term *methodological*. One illustration shows the importance of this conception. All investigations of bodily and mental functions, explain bodily processes by one set of categories, and mental processes by another. So far little success has been attained in the attempt to unify these two sets of conceptions. Clear thinking demands that they be kept apart. Nevertheless, these concepts must not be made constitutive, for that would mean a dualism between body and mind. They are *methodological* only, and when this is recognized they are used critically. In no case, therefore, are we pledged to a metaphysical dualism when we are unable to see how two concepts can be united. This conception of methodology solves philosophically, not only the problem of body and soul, but also the problems of appearance and reality, subject and object, sense and thought etc.

The two following chapters, dealing with the metaphysical basis of Lotze's theory of knowledge, will enquire into the problem, and the nature of the solution which Lotze has given to the questions of appearance and reality, and of subject and object. The problem of the relation of sense and thought belongs rather to logic and psychology, and will not be dealt with at present.

CHAPTER II.

THE APPEARANCE OF REALITY.

IN chapter I we discussed the nature of Lotze's problem and method. From the point of view thus gained we will now proceed to interpret his doctrine of the appearance of reality. In order to understand this problem, and the way in which it was solved, let us examine somewhat carefully the intellectual atmosphere in which Lotze grew up. Since Lotze's philosophical system was constructed as early as 1841, we need not consider problems which arose after that date. In logic two distinct views were advanced. One was phenomenalism, the other absolute idealism. Phenomenalism, on its scientific side, was regarded as empiricism. It represented the world of actual fact, knowledge of which must be obtained through experience, and by means of the Baconian method.¹ This empiricism profoundly influenced Lotze, and gave both him and Herbart their method. On its philosophical side, however, phenomenalism was not so fortunate. Remaining in its Kantian form, it made a knowledge of reality impossible, so that a reinterpretation of empiricism became necessary. Neither did absolute idealism solve the problem undertaken by Kant. It ran counter to the empirical tendency of the age, and had a contempt for empirical knowledge.² Before Hegel's death the disintegration of his doctrine that thought *is* reality, had begun. The new movement developed in some cases in the direction of pantheism and atheism,³ in others towards materialism.⁴ Now Kantian empiricism with the unknowability of reality on the one side, and Hegelian speculation with its doctrine of the identity of thought and reality on the other, represent the two extreme sides of philosophical speculation. Nevertheless these two antithetic systems contain concep-

¹ Cf. Beneke : Erdmann, *op. cit.*, § 334, 1-2. Beneke was one of the first to object to the speculative method of philosophy.

² Erdmann : *op. cit.*, §§ 333, 2 ; 347, II.

³ *Ibid.*, § 338, 1-5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, § 345.

tions of vital importance ; and as Lotze's own theory of knowledge and reality lies somewhere between these two points of view, it will serve to interpret his philosophy if we examine the Kantian and Hegelian theory of knowledge, and then show how his theory is related to these two positions. These two theories dominated German thought when Lotze was at the university, and it was natural that he should mediate between them, since he sympathized with, and was a careful student of, both empirical and speculative philosophy.¹

I. Kant, holding the common-sense point of view, and also the common-sense interpretation of that point of view, began with the assumption that there are two kinds of reality, material and spiritual existences. These two existences—things-in-themselves, and the ego—have some causal influence upon one another; but what this relation implied Kant did not enquire. His aim was chiefly epistemological, and his special endeavor was to discover the machinery of knowing. According to his conception, the external object affects the subject only in sense, and by means of this activity impressions are made upon sense, which are the data the mind synthesizes by means of its categories. Thus the manifold of sense becomes the unified system of knowledge. In other words, the matter of knowledge is given by the object, the form by the mind, and the union of these two elements is knowledge. But what does this really mean? Is this unity of sense-data knowledge? According to Kant this mental construction is twice removed from reality, and cannot, therefore, be knowledge of reality. If it is knowledge at all, it must be knowledge of itself. Let us now see how he arrives at the doctrine of the subjectivity of knowledge. Things-in-themselves, when they produce a perception in consciousness, contribute the manifold to the forms of receptivity. But in entering sense the manifold is in space and time, forms which did not originally belong to it. Consequently it bears no resemblance to what it was in reality. A further transformation, however, occurs when the forms of the understanding combine these data into a unity. Since now the thing contributes its data to the subject by which they are categorized,

¹ *Ibid.*, § 347, II.

this union of matter and form arises *within the subject*. But as this union of elements is knowledge, knowledge itself is a subjective appearance within the subject. It is nothing but a state of the subject, and not an objective account of reality.¹ It is true that the subject, being self-conscious, knows this state. A state of the subject it is, however, and nothing more. The subject cannot get beyond his own states. All that he can know is phenomena. Reality he cannot know ; for the process of knowing brings reality within the subject, where it is transformed into a state of the subject. And this transformed reality is no longer reality, nor even like reality. Now it is this transformed reality which is known. This doctrine, however, is self-contradictory, for it declares reality both knowable and unknowable at the same time. Reality is known, for it is regarded as the source from which is obtained the matter of knowledge ; but it is unknowable because knowledge is within the subject.²

Presumably, then, on Kant's theory of knowledge, if the matter of knowledge could be got pure and just as it is in the object before it is modified by the forms of sensibility and understanding, reality might be known. But since all finite consciousness obtrudes a form upon the matter, the data are so transformed that they are no longer like the thing from which they came ; and, not being a copy of reality, no key is given to show what relation they bear to reality. Now, this doctrine of the unknowability of the object presupposes : (1) a false and abstract distinction between form and matter ;³ (2) the view that appearance only is known, at least directly ;⁴ (3) the dogma that if reality is knowable, it can be known only indirectly through the mediation of appearance which must be an identical likeness or copy of reality ;⁵ (4) the traditional dualism, which Kant accepted, between subject and object. The three first objections are logical, the fourth is metaphysical. This logical position is

¹ *Gesch. d. Phil.*, § 36.

² *Ibid.*, § 25 ; Cf. also Seth. A ; *Epistemology in Locke and Kant*, Phil. Rev., II, pp. 172-186.

³ *Logik*, § 326.

⁴ *Ibid.*, § 312.

⁵ *Ibid.*, § 304.

that of representative perception. On this view appearance is not reality, but in some unknown way floats before reality, and perhaps is like reality, or a copy of it. This is apparently what Kant, working along traditional lines, would wish to make appearance. Having, however, laid aside the doctrine of the *tabula rasa*, according to which the mind is wholly receptive and mirrors reality, and, further, having adopted the notion of the activity of consciousness, Kant is impelled to the position that appearance is a compound of form and matter, and neither like things-in-themselves which contribute the matter, nor like the mind which furnished the form.¹ Knowledge of the ego or of the mind is equally impossible. Consequently, the only object of knowledge is appearance. Kant's metaphysical position likewise makes knowledge of reality impossible. He accepted the dualism of subject and object, and thereby so ordered his concepts that reality is unknowable.

Lotze's answer to Kant, therefore, consists of the following propositions: (1) Reality is not unknowable; (2) appearance is the knowledge of reality; (3) there is no dualism between subject and object (this last proposition will be discussed in Chapter III).

Lotze rejects Kant's agnosticism. "The theory," he says, "for which the adherents of the popular philosophy of the Kantian school become enthusiastic is quite untenable because it holds that only phenomena are perceived, and that the reality, which corresponds to these phenomena, has not the least analogy to the relations which exist between the different parts of these phenomena."² Lotze goes beyond Kant and maintains that reality is not unknowable; on the contrary, reality is known. It *appears* in perception and in thought to the subject, and is not concealed by its representation.³ The existence of reality is necessary for logical theory; it is also a logical demand that reality is known. Even Kant's philosophy implied reality, though it could not be known because Kant made it unknowable.⁴

¹ *Logik*, §§ 322-333.

² *Gesch. d. Phil.*, § 25.

³ Cf. *Mikr.*, II, pp. 322, 349 ff., 629, 697; *Met.*, §§ 47, 90, 93, 97; *Logik*, §§ 325-358, 359; *Gr. d. Met.*, Part III.

⁴ Cf. Jacobi: *Werke*, II, p. 304.

Moreover, there is a demand not only for the existence of reality, but also for a knowledge of it. If we know, we know *something*, some *reality*. But Kant's system made no provision for this knowledge, and allows only a cognition of appearance. Appearance could be known, and as a matter of fact was known, but it contributed nothing to knowledge of reality. Further, thought might elaborate appearance and reduce it to scientific precision, and arrange it under, and comprehend it by, concepts ; but in all this labor and refinement it got no nearer to a knowledge of reality. The logical mind might have been content with this lack of knowledge had it not been conscious all the while that there is reality, and that it knows reality. Philosophy cannot dictate what is knowable and what is unknowable, but has the much humbler duty of making intelligible and deepening our comprehension of the things which we already know. So it is in this case ; the Kantian conclusions did not satisfy the demands of consciousness, and further attempts were made to get a theory of knowledge which would take account of reality and the thing-in-itself.

Though there was the evidence of consciousness for a knowledge of reality, there seemed to be no *logical* justification of it. Moreover, the conclusions which denied a knowledge of reality seemed fairly drawn, and there appeared to be no resource left but to admit the impossibility of knowing the real world. It must, indeed, be admitted so long as the presuppositions on which this conclusion rests are maintained, so long as subject and object belong to different worlds, and so long as appearance alone is known, that of course there is possible no knowledge of the reality which lies behind appearance.

II. So far we have discussed the thesis which Lotze found current in the philosophy of his time—'Appearance is not reality and gives no knowledge of reality.' The antithesis maintained by Hegel and his followers asserts that 'appearance is reality, and that the knowledge of appearance is the knowledge of reality.' Kant's successors were not content with his doctrine of the unknowability of reality. Kant, it seemed to them, first divided the world into two parts, appearance and

reality, and then tried to put it together again, but found this task impossible because the elements used in the reconstruction of the cosmos had been reduced to abstractions by the act of separating them. Appearance should not be separated from reality, for if this division is made there is no means of passing from a knowledge of appearance to a knowledge of reality. The only way out of this difficulty is to deny that there is any reality behind appearance. This difficulty, to be sure, only arises if we begin with Kant's presuppositions ; but, if we start with these presuppositions, the only logical course is to remove the world of things-in-themselves.¹ Lotze who was conscious of the contradiction contained in the conception of unknowable things-in-themselves remarks : " Later Idealism was therefore consistent in renouncing completely the thought of a world of things which are to serve as the transcendental objects of our knowledge. So long, however, as we agree with Kant in opposing the objects of sense or phenomena to things-in-themselves or noumena, we are compelled to assert of noumena that they are at least that which appears. Furthermore, we cannot avoid regarding these things-in-themselves as the operative causes which produce perceptions in us, and we must assert of them by all means then, plurality and manifold relations between the many, on which alone the variety, manifoldness, and succession of our perceptions depend."² But Lotze immediately goes on to declare this view untenable, and holds that there is no basis for the doctrine that we know *mere* appearance and that reality remains behind it unknown. The logical course is to deny things-in-themselves, and this is what was done by Post-Kantians. There is nothing beyond appearance, this school maintains. Properly understood, appearance is reality, and therefore when appearance is known reality is known, for the one is the other, and there is no *hiatus* between them. The understanding makes nature, but in a deeper sense than Kant meant, and the Post-Kantians sought to bring out this deeper meaning in mental creation by substituting the term 'reason' for 'understanding.' For Kant the understanding

¹ Cf. Seth, A., *The Epistemology of Neo-Kantianism*, Phil. Rev., II, pp. 293-315.

² *Gesch. d. Phil.*, § 25.

makes phenomenal nature, but for the Post-Kantians reason makes reality itself, for reason *is* reality, and its logical categories are the metaphysical laws and principles of reality.

The expression 'appearance is reality' needs a word of explanation. If appearance means nothing more than the presentations that flit before our gaze, or in our imagination, then we admit that no one outside of the school of Berkeley and Hume has ever held such a doctrine. If the *esse* of things is *percipi*, and if the *percipi* is appearance, then Post-Kantian philosophers do not maintain that appearance is reality. But since the *Critique of Pure Reason* was published, the mere 'bundle of ideas' is not all that is meant by appearance. The appearance which Kant opposed to reality is not a mere group or series of disconnected presentations; on the contrary, appearance is the tissue of categorized sense-data constructed by the concepts of the understanding. It is the product of form and matter which is appearance or phenomenon. In this sense appearance is the whole world of knowledge which consists of the judgments of experience,¹ and is not the mere show-world of sense as is often supposed. It is true, however, that experience includes the *visible* world, for the visible world exists only as a construction of the understanding, but to maintain that this is the only world given in sense-perception, and in the concepts of thought, would be a wrong limitation. For Kant the understanding makes nature, and this nature is a system of judgments—judgments of experience. Appearance *is* this mental construction, or continued judgment of experience.² Appearance is what the mind has made out of the data given in sense, and it is everything that is present to the understanding. Appearance, then, we may regard as man's mental construct.³

It may seem that we are taking an unwarranted liberty with terms in defining appearance as a mental construction. But as we have tried to show, this conception follows logically from Kant's own position. We wish to use this mode of expression because it seems to bring out clearly what Lotze's problem was,

¹ Kant : *Proleg. to Met.*, § 18.

² Cf. Bosanquet's conception of nature : *Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 76-79.

³ Windelband : *Gesch. d. Phil.* (Eng. Trans.), p. 573.

and how he solved it. Moreover, it is obvious that only an arbitrary distinction can be drawn between the narrower and the wider use of this concept, and to draw a distinction where none need be drawn, is as great a source of error as the wider use of the term. That only a logical division exists is plain on an examination of mental phenomena. For Kant appearance is a mental construction. Now grant that this means that only the sense-object (so-called) is the mental construction which is called appearance; yet even this object itself is the work of the categories, and is therefore more than an object of mere sense. Already the distinction is broken down, and we feel still more the arbitrariness of this division if we endeavor to distinguish the object as mental construction from our thoughts about the object as also a mental construction, for if we separate them, both the object and our thought about the object are mental constructions, and it is not at all apparent how any distinction can be maintained. In this case the object and our thought of the object are the same. Appearance *is* reality, or to use the more common phrase, in a certain sense, thought and reality are one.

This doctrine that there is no thing-in-itself behind appearance, makes the theory of knowledge intelligible; so the Post-Kantians taught. Since appearance is reality, so soon as we have knowledge of appearance we have knowledge of reality. There is therefore no demand to get behind appearance; that is an impossible as well as a fruitless undertaking, for our mental construction, which is our knowledge, is the real. That which thought thinks is reality, but reality is appearance.¹ "The 'phenomenon' is for Kant a human mode of representation, for Hegel an objective externalizing of the Absolute Spirit."²

The thing-in-itself for Hegel is not reality as it is for Kant, but only the *Ansich*, the thing *in embryo*. It is *in* appearance.³ "Idealism opposes to the realistic acknowledgement of the unknowable nature of thing, the bold assertion that thought and being are identical."⁴ Although this does not mean explicitly

¹ Hegel: *Encyk.*, § 22; *Werke*, VI, pp. 42 f.

² Windelband: *op. cit.*, p. 611, n. 3.

³ *Encyk.*, § 74; *Werke*, VI, pp. 141-143.

⁴ *Mikr.*, II, 351.

that finite cognition "will sometime succeed in penetrating by thought the existence of all things, and recreating it in idea," it does, however, maintain that so far as human cognition goes, it reveals the very nature of reality. Human thought uses the same categories which exist in real things, and this theory of knowledge holds that the depths of reality can be explored. For a finite being to pretend to do this seems to Lotze presumption, "yet," he says, "to do all this was just what was promised by the bold and striking expression given to the proposition which made being identical with thinking; it led one to expect that just that by which being as being seemed at first to be irreconcilably differentiated from thinking or from being thought, would finally be presented as a vanishing distinction, and that this being would be altogether resolved into thoughts."¹ This idealism is not satisfied with general outlines of reality, but endeavors to see all things *sub specie aeternitatis*. As Lotze is fond of saying, this philosophy would represent everything as it is in relation to the center, and will not accept a partial or periphery knowledge of things. "With Reinhold, and chiefly through Fichte, arose the prejudice that every true science, and especially philosophy *must start out from one single principle*."² Again Lotze says: "Idealism, the most familiar form of which is found in Hegel's philosophy, is driven naturally in a direction away from realism. . . . Beginning with the prime truth that the world is a whole, all of whose parts depend upon a single governing idea, this idealism can find an interest only in beholding all things in the Absolute, *i. e.*, in seeking for the meaning which they possess for the realization of the idea in which alone they have their ground and function."³

Lotze's contention is that absolute idealism deifies human cognition, and takes human concepts as the actual forms of reality. He himself, however, maintains that "the name 'concept' does not seem to deserve in logic that exalted significance which the school of Hegel has given it, and in which it claims to ex-

¹ *Mikr.*, II, 352.

² *Gesch. d. Ph.*, § 34.

³ *Med. Psy.*, pp. 156, 157.—Cf. *Logik*, § 150.

press the knowledge of the essential nature of the object.”¹ How the concept was deified, and used as an ontological principle, instead of retaining its methodological use, we will now endeavor to show. This discussion will reveal Lotze’s chief objection to Hegelian idealism.

As we have tried to show, some Post-Kantians, of whom we may take Hegel as a representative, did not distinguish between appearance and reality. They dropped the doctrine of the thing-in-itself, and affirmed that appearance is reality. Reality is a system of reason; appearance is the same, and this identity of thought and reality makes knowledge possible. It does not matter, they claim, whether we distinguish between the construction of the Idea, and that of each finite spirit; for in so far as each is rational, there really is no distinction. The finite in so far as it is rational is universal or infinite, and in the perception of truth finite and infinite agree. Just as the Idea develops through a system of concepts organic to each other, so the finite consciousness, when it labors dialectically, rises through the same stages as mark the progress of the Absolute, till it reaches the Idea itself. “From the outset he [Hegel] looked on the motion of our thought in its efforts to gain a clear idea of this still obscure goal of our aspiration as the proper inward development of the Absolute itself, which only needed to be pursued consistently, in order gradually to bring into consciousness all that the universe contains.”² Since, now, the human mind reproduces the Absolute, appearance is reality, and it cannot be anything else. A further result of this doctrine is that the principles which man uses in his construction of appearance are identical with those present in reality, or in the mind of the Idea.³ This means that man’s concepts are constitutive principles of reality, and reconstruct reality in his own experience. These principles, therefore, are much more than the methodological concepts by means of which a knowing mind arranges its experience for the purpose of intelligible treatment and communication. They are ontological concepts in the full intent of the word.

¹ *Logik*, § 27.

² *Met.*, § 88.

³ Lotze, however, does not admit that the Hegelian Idea is a person. *Med. Psy.*, p. 157.

Some notion of the ontological nature of these concepts, as Lotze interprets Hegel, becomes plain when we glance at the task which Hegel set himself in his *Wissenschaft der Logik*. Starting with the idea that reality is a unity of organic concepts, Hegel believed that one concept contained implicitly all the rest. If, now, thought grasps one concept, it will gradually unfold from it, whole and entire, the complete universe of concepts. If, now, this were completed, it would be the actual concept-system of reality, and every concept would possess its actual worth. For a perfect intelligence this is possible; but how can man, by the energy and scrutiny of reason, pass through the same development as the Idea followed? Man undoubtedly does rise a certain distance in this dialectic, but he must remember that his concepts are very imperfect. Were he, however, to demand that his knowledge should not cease till it reached that of the Idea, he must maintain that all his concepts have the same denotation and connotation as have the concepts of an absolute intelligence. Such concepts are constitutive; but if they are less than this they are methodological.

Whether this is a correct exposition of Hegelian philosophy does not matter for our purpose. But that Lotze interprets Hegel in this way seems very evident from the passages in which he criticises Hegel, and also from his general attitude towards absolute idealism. Moreover, Lotze's criticisms of the Post-Kantians can best be understood if the above is regarded as his interpretation. As we have attempted to show, according to Lotze's comprehension of Hegel, the great apostle of absolute idealism regards reason as the real principle of the cosmos, or even the cosmos itself. Any being, therefore, who possesses reason is able to reconstruct reality in his own experience, and, furthermore, if this being is a philosopher and uses the dialectic method, he can begin with any concept of his experience and reconstruct the totality of reality, thus reaching the point of view of the Idea, from which he can behold the cosmos from the center, and see it in its true proportions just as it appears to deity.¹ The thinking of reality, therefore, repro-

¹ *Mikr.*, II, pp. 351-360; *Logik*, Introd., § IX, also §§ 20, 27; *Med. Psy.*, pp. 151-160; *Geschichte d. Aesthetik*, pp. 168-185.

duces it or creates it. The concepts of such knowledge are the very concepts in reality, the identical principles and laws of reality ; they are reality itself. These concepts, therefore, are ontological or metaphysical, not subjective and methodological, and express absolute, not relative, truth.

III. Let us now sum up this discussion, and state the results of these two opposite points of view as they appear to Lotze. For Kant, appearance is a mental construction consisting of form and matter, the former element contributed by the mind, the latter by the object. This intellectual construct is known, and it is all that is known. The reality which provides the *a posteriori* matter is wholly unlike the construct and is unknowable. For Hegel and his school, on the other hand, this mental construct is known, and it is all that is known. But beyond this synthesis there is no thing-in-itself or reality. The only reality is the synthesis of form and matter, and this synthesis is at once both the thing known and the knowledge of it. Thus both Kant and the Hegelian school agree that we know appearance and appearance only ; but whereas Kant maintains that there is an unknowable object behind phenomena, the Hegelians contend that knowledge and reality are one, and that we know reality just as it is. Now, from Lotze's point of view, both these theories express a truth partially, and both are one-sided. Kant is right when he upholds the doctrine that appearance is a mental construction, but is not reality. He errs, however, when he concludes that reality is therefore unknowable. On the other hand, Hegelians are justified in maintaining that appearance is an intellectual synthesis, and that reality is known. But it is too much to affirm that human cognition is reality, or even an absolute knowledge of reality. Furthermore, a comparison of these two theories of knowledge makes it evident that they agree in maintaining that appearance is an intellectual construction ; and that it is *appearance* that is known.¹

¹ It may be asserted that this is an impossible view, and that Kant and Hegel did not hold it ; for appearance, it is said, has a meaning only when contrasted with reality. Now we admit that the idea of appearance implies the idea of reality. But this apparent contradiction is easily removed by a change of term. Instead of the word appearance use 'nature,' as Kant did, or 'reality,' as did Post-Kantians, and no contradiction arises—not that the contradiction is not really present, but the terms are so selected that there does not appear to be a contradiction.

Neither of these doctrines seemed satisfactory to Lotze. If the Kantian *Critique* robbed knowledge of all significance, and made reality unknowable, the Hegelian system raised human cognition to the skies, and actually deified it. If the former regarded man as mentally impotent, the latter gave him omniscient penetration into the essence of reality. It is Lotze's purpose to mediate between these two opposite theories.

IV. Lotze's criticism of Kantian and of absolute idealism brings out his own conception of knowledge, and this is the reason why it seems necessary to devote so much attention to it. From this point his criticism is constructive, though it is based on the discussion of the theories already examined, and may be stated in two propositions, each of which will be considered in turn: (1) appearance is not like reality, but is knowledge about reality; (2) the concepts used in knowledge are not the metaphysical principles of reality, but man's way of interpreting the world.

Appearance is our knowledge about reality. The critical philosophy, and especially its later forms, being unable to get from appearance to reality, denied the existence of everything outside of appearance.¹ But according to Lotze knowledge is not confined to appearance, but comprehends reality. *Reality is known in appearance.*² Phenomena are not³ things, nor are they like things.⁴ On the contrary, phenomena are an interpretation of things. "Phenomena are, nevertheless, always phenomena of something or other, for some subject or other."⁵ Appearance is the mental construction or knowledge which the subject has of the object; and there is really no question as to whether appearance is like or unlike the object. Such a question should not arise, for the very question implies that *knowledge* of an object is like the object. But how can knowledge be compared with a thing? There is, indeed, an "opposition between the object of our knowledge and our knowledge of that object."⁶ But sup-

¹ The category of the *Ding-an-Sich* is retained, but it is put within appearance. Hegel, *Werke*, VI, pp. 141-143; *Encyk.*, § 74.

² Cf. Erdmann: *op. cit.*, § 347, II.

³ *Logik*, § 316.

⁴ *Ibid.*, § 304.

⁵ *Gr. d. Met.*, § 33; Cf. *Mikr.*, II, pp. 157, 160.

⁶ *Logik*, *Introd.*, § XIII.

pose that knowledge resembles its object. The consciousness, therefore, which perceives this resemblance must know the object, and also the knowledge of the object. In this case, however, the object is known independently of the knowing of it.

At the basis of all this confusion is the doctrine, however much it may be disguised, that we know *knowledge*. To know appearance and to know knowledge is the same thing, for appearance, as understood by Kant, included "the whole compass of human knowledge." Though the word appearance may not always have been used for the whole mental interpretation of reality, still this mental construction, this one continuous judgment, is what appearance really is. This continuous judgment is just the way in which reality *appears* to us. Therefore it is our knowledge of reality. For this reason we do not first know appearance, and then reality. The truth is, we do not know *appearance* in any case; but what we *do* know is reality, and *appearance is our knowledge of reality*.

This point is so important that it must be discussed further, even at the risk of tediousness. We desire to show more fully that knowledge or appearance is a mental construction of reality. It is knowledge *of* reality or an appearance of objects. In thinking—and by this term I include all the activities of the self—reality is known. For Lotze this is a postulate, and it is not given us to understand how a mental construction can be knowledge of reality. "We assume that the process of thinking is *determined* so as to lead to the knowledge of the true nature of things."¹ Now this knowledge which consciousness constructs is appearance, or, to use a phrase commoner in Lotze's writings, a system of ideas.

Reality can be known only in ideas. Things cannot enter into consciousness and be known before they are known in ideas. "It is indeed even incomprehensible how the intuition of a present thing should make me know this thing as it is in itself, as its properties cannot migrate into my faculty of representation."² Even though things could actually come into the mind, they

¹ *Gr. d. Logik*, § 5.

² Kant: *Proleg.*, § 9.

would not be known until they appeared.¹ Our ideas *are* our knowledge of things, and the only knowledge we can have, and in order to make this plain "we have to show that nothing else but the connection of our ideas can ever be made the object of our investigations."² Our knowledge is a continuous judgment about reality, or a system of ideas about reality. "All we know of the external world depends upon the ideas of it which are within us ; it is so far entirely indifferent whether with Idealism, we deny the existence of that world, and regard our ideas of it as above reality, or whether we maintain with Realism the existence of things outside us which act upon our minds. On the latter hypothesis as little as on the former do the things themselves pass into our knowledge ; they only awaken in us ideas, which are not Things."³ Though we know the external object in ideas, it is impossible to compare our ideas with reality in order to see if they are true. "It is not this assumed external world of the Real which comes in here between our ideas as the standard by which their truth is to be measured : the standard is always the conception of which we cannot get rid, of what such a world must be if it *does* exist ; is always, that is to say, a thought in our own minds."⁴ In knowledge it is not possible to go outside of our ideas and learn what reality is like without knowing it. Not only are we confined to the circle of knowledge, but every critique of knowledge and all criteria of knowledge are within and immanent, never external and transcendent.⁵ This point has been worked out so admirably by Bosanquet that is no need to dwell further upon it here. But whereas Bosanquet identifies knowledge—not necessarily the individual's knowledge, but the knowledge of the universal—and reality,⁶ Lotze distinguishes them and regards the continuous judgment of consciousness as the individual's knowledge of reality, and not reality itself. Reality is not made or unmade by knowing it : it is quite different

¹ *Logik*, § 308.

² *Ibid.*, § 304.

³ *Ibid.*, § 306, Cf. also §§ 3, 153, 315, 355.

⁴ *Ibid.*, § 306.

⁵ *Ibid.*, § 322.

⁶ *Logik*, I, pp. 3 ff., 41 ff., 76 ff.

from knowledge. Nevertheless reality is known. It *appears* to consciousness as a continuous judgment. In saying that a thing *appears* all that is really meant is that it is known. That we can only know a thing in appearance has been considered a defect of the human mind, a defect which higher intelligences do not share.¹ On the contrary, Lotze maintains that there is no knowledge apart from appearance. "We may exalt the intelligence of more perfect beings above our own as high as we please ; but so long as we desire to attach any rational meaning to it, it must always fall under some category of knowledge or direct perception, or cognition, that is to say it will never *be* the thing itself but only an aggregate of ideas *about* the thing."²

A comparison of this theory of knowledge with skepticism serves to show its real nature. So long as ideas are taken as copies or symbols of things-in-themselves, a doubt may be raised whether they really give us knowledge about reality ; but *if ideas are already knowledge about reality*, then there is no meaning in imagining that they may not give us knowledge of things : for in this latter case we know things so soon as we have ideas of them. If, on the other hand, we can have ideas before they are *ideas of a thing*, then there is a serious doubt as to whether we can ever know the thing. If, however, skepticism "indulges the apprehension that everything may be in reality quite different from what it necessarily appears," it "sets out with a self-contradiction, because it silently takes for granted the possibility of an apprehension which does not apprehend things, but is itself things, and then goes on to question whether this impossible perfection is allotted to our intelligence."³

The point of view which we have endeavored to set forth has been put in a curt sentence : ' We only know phenomena.' But, like many another concise statement, this one is easily misunderstood, and gives a wrong emphasis to the object of knowledge. For these reasons Lotze justly objects to it. He says : " I avoid

¹ Cf. Kant's notion of the limitations of man's knowledge, and of the *Intellectuelle Anschauung* of God. *Werke* (Hartenstein's ed.), Vol. III, p. 79; *Kr. d. r. V.* (2d Ed.), pp. 67, 68.

² *Logik*, § 308.

³ *Ibid.*, § 309.

that particular form of statement because it still contains a prejudice which I should wish to see abandoned. . . . The proposition plainly carries the idea of a thwarted purpose. That 'only' implies that our knowledge which was intended by rights for the apprehension of the higher, the essence of things, has to be content with the lower, the phenomenon. . . . But we can see at once that it is an arbitrary proceeding to place knowledge in the position of a means which is *not* adequate to its supposed end of apprehending things as they are."¹ Returning to our own way of interpreting Lotze, we would say that the statement: 'We only know phenomena,' does not say what is meant. It is meant to say we know objects *only in phenomena*. We cannot really know phenomena, for phenomena are our mental constructions, or our knowledge of things. We only know things, but we know them only in phenomena. The latter clause only repeats the former, for both have the same meaning: for to know anything is to know it in phenomena. Thus it is clear what Lotze means when he says "that nothing else but the connection of our ideas with each other can ever be made the object of our investigations."² His meaning is that we can never get outside of knowledge; in our logical studies we cannot step outside of our own ideas and look on the process from without. No external criticism is possible, knowledge is its own critic.³ Nor is metaphysic or any other sphere of knowledge an exception. To get outside of knowledge, or outside of appearance, is not to possess divine knowledge, it is simply to be ignorant.

Appearance, therefore, is not reality, it is *of* reality. Knowledge is not reality, it is *of* reality. "Nothing is simpler than to convince ourselves that every apprehending intelligence can only see things as they look to it when it perceives them; he who demands a knowledge which should be more than a perfectly connected and consistent system of ideas about the thing, a knowledge which should actually exhaust the thing itself, is no longer asking for knowledge at all, but for something entirely unintelligible. One cannot even say that he is desiring not to

¹ *Logik*, § 312.

² *Ibid.*, § 304.

³ *Ibid.*, §§ 305, 306; 322.

know but to *be* the things themselves; for in fact he would not even so reach his goal. Could he arrive in some way or other at *being* that very metal itself, the knowledge of which in the way of ideas does not content him; well, he would *be* metal it is true, but he would be further off than ever from apprehending himself as the metal which he had become. Or supposing that a higher power gave him back his intelligence while he still remained metal, even then in his new character of intelligent metal he would still only apprehend himself in such wise as he would be represented to himself in his own ideas, not as he would be apart from such representation.”¹

There is another aspect of this question which brings out clearly what Lotze's real position is. Appearance or knowledge is not reality, nor is it a copy of reality. The old theory of representative perception which starts with a knowledge of subjective ideas as the primary datum, was compelled to say that ideas were like things, or copies of things. This theory looks upon mind and knowing from an external point of view; and since the observer is outside of a being who perceives some object, he is conscious of both object and subject, and to him both are objects. Furthermore, he knows that these two objects act upon one another, and that one produces a state in the other (the conscious object). Consequently, to this observer the mechanism of knowing consists in an object, a conscious being, and a state of consciousness within the latter. Naturally now he says the state of consciousness represents the object, is a copy of it perhaps, and from a knowledge of the state a knowledge of the object is derived. As I understand Lotze, this copy-theory, or this form of representative perception, is quite inconsistent with the spirit of his philosophy. Nevertheless, passages from his works can be cited which seem to show that he has not always avoided—at least in form of statement—the difficulties of the datum-theory of knowledge.

That ideas are like things, or are copies of them, Lotze denies. From the very nature of knowing, which implies an activity of the subject, ideas cannot be like things, nor be a copy of them.² The

¹ *Logik*, § 308.

² *Ibid.*, *Introd.*, § VIII, § 327; *Gr. d. Met.*, § 77; *Gr. d. Psy.*, § 12; *Mikr.*, I, pp. 563 f., II, 611–617.

attempt to treat ideas as copies of things is the root of skepticism, and the same can be held of any form of representative perception which regards knowing as a passage from knowledge of ideas to knowledge of objects.¹ This is evident so soon as the question is considered. For if it be asked whether knowledge is like, or whether it looks like reality, or is a correct picture of things, or, in fact, is a picture in any sense, then there is only one answer to these questions, and that is we do not know. Consequently, if knowledge of reality depends upon our ability to give an answer to this inquiry, there does not appear to be any way in which skepticism can be avoided. Lotze was aware of this. He says: "The doubting question, therefore, whether things may not be in fact quite different from what they necessarily appear to us, has *prima facie* an intelligible sense only upon the assumption that human knowledge is intended to be a copy of a world of things."²

There is no meaning in the question whether or not appearance is like reality. It is a question which cannot be answered, because it is a question which should not be asked. There is no way in which the appearance of a thing can be compared with the *thing as it does not appear*. Our knowledge of a thing cannot be compared with the same thing when it is not known. It is sometimes said that knowing distorts the thing, and that for this reason things cannot be known. The answer to this objection is two-fold. In the first place, it should be remembered that knowledge is not a sort of reality, which can make or unmake things, and so affect the object itself. And, secondly, if it is admitted that knowing does not really distort the *object*, can it be maintained that knowing distorts our knowledge? Neither of these alternatives can be supported, and as they both depend for their appearance of validity upon the dogma that knowledge must be like reality, a correct comprehension of this problem is necessary for a theory of knowledge. But it may be said: Cannot things appear in some other way? This may be possible; and in fact things do not appear in precisely the same manner to every one. But could things appear in totally new forms? We

¹ *Logik*, § 304.

² *Ibid.*, § 304.

simply do not know, but this question itself is an intelligible one, and may conceivably have an answer. Can things be known *without* appearing? This question, we take it, has no meaning and no answer. It is true that we can ask the question, and on receiving no answer, we can, if we will, accept mere skepticism. But this kind of skepticism, which rests on no accepted facts, is what Lotze calls a "groundless skepticism."¹ We can suppose if we will that appearance is only an idle show, but it is a groundless supposition, and a "curious solicitude."²

V. Before we take up the second point of Lotze's criticism of the Hegelian philosophy, it will be well to notice a criticism which has been made on Lotze's doctrine of knowing reality in appearance. Mr. Eastwood says: "He [Lotze] constantly adopts that 'common-sense' usage of 'idea' by which the term is taken to mean a representation, true or false, of an object; a 'mere idea' being a representation to which no object corresponds, or a representation considered apart from its object. We hear of objects 'corresponding' or 'not corresponding' with conceptions, of things being 'more than' thoughts, of the 'possible,' *i. e.*, the world of conceptions, being 'wider than' the real; of 'thing' with no 'counterpart' in thought, and thoughts with no 'counterpart' in things."³ Now the author sees that there is a popular plausibility in this theory which says that ideas represent things, or that things appear to the subject in ideas, and he finds that this seductive speciousness rests upon the false disjunction "either knowledge *is* things in themselves, or knowledge *only represents* things in themselves."⁴ Lotze, he says, takes these two alternatives as exhaustive; therefore "naturally every one, be he inclined to Idealism or Realism, will decide to adopt the second proposition, *always provided that we are compelled to choose either the one or the other.*" But, he proceeds, we are not compelled to choose either terms of this disjunction. The true alternative is: "thought must be the unity for which the manifold of things exists."⁵

¹ *Logik*, § 303.

² *Ibid.*, § 303.

³ "Lotze's *Antithesis between Thought and Things*," *Mind*, 1892, p. 309.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 475.

With this analysis, which the author says exhausts all possible cases, Mr. Eastwood continues: "that knowledge could never *be* things in themselves is perfectly true, because *things in themselves are, if they exist at all, a manifold of particulars*; [italics mine] whereas knowledge implies a *universalization of particulars* [italics mine], and a *unity* of a manifold, which as such can never *be* a manifold. But just for the same reason it is true that knowledge can never *represent* things-in-themselves. A unity of a manifold is a whole, one and inseparable; but a whole can no more represent any of its parts than it can be any of them."¹ Since, therefore, the first two alternatives are rejected, there is nothing to do but to adopt the remaining. So far as I can see, however, Mr. Eastwood has given no proof that he has exhausted all possible cases, and that the third is the only true expression of the relation of thought and reality.

Let us now briefly examine this criticism of Lotze. In the first place, it seems clear that Mr. Eastwood means by an idea something quite different from what Lotze means by it. As we have tried to show, an idea for Lotze is already and in itself a bit of information about reality. Our system of ideas is our knowledge about reality. Mr. Eastwood does not adopt this view. "Of course," he says, "if 'idea' simply = 'that which we know' every one will concede Lotze's postulate, but a moment's consideration will show that, on this interpretation, the postulate is quite barren and tautologous. We are thus naturally led to ask: Does not Lotze import some additional meaning into the term 'idea'? I think every one who reads him must perceive that he does."²

Just what Mr. Eastwood understands by the expression: 'idea = that which we know,' is not easy to make out; for this expression may have two meanings: either (1) that our ideas are our knowledge of reality, or (2) our ideas *are the things* which we know. Both of these views seem to be held in turn by Mr. Eastwood. The criticism quoted from p. 309 seems to have point only on condition that the second interpretation is taken. Again he remarks: "Although I cannot find in the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 475.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 308, 309.

Ontology any explanation why a 'thing' should be more than or other than a thought, I think I can find the reason why no such explanation is there forthcoming."¹ This passage seems to imply the same doctrine. But the first interpretation also seems to be maintained; for he uses synonymously idea, knowledge, and thought.²

Leaving this point, however, let us return to Mr. Eastwood's criticism of Lotze's disjunction. As was seen above, he says, if there are only the two alternatives: (1) "knowledge *is* things-in-themselves; (2) knowledge *only represents* things-in-themselves," we must accept the latter, for knowledge can never *be* things in themselves. His reason for rejecting this alternative is that *things in themselves are a mere manifold of particulars*. This argument would not be a criticism of Lotze even though Lotze had maintained that knowledge *is* things-in-themselves; for Lotze does not mean by things-in-themselves 'a mere manifold of particulars.'³ We mention this fact because if Mr. Eastwood understands Lotze to mean by things-in-themselves or reality 'a mere manifold of particulars,' then we agree with the critic in saying thought cannot represent such a reality as this. This, however, does not decide the point against Lotze. Again, let us notice what Mr. Eastwood means by knowledge. For him knowledge is an "*universalization of particulars*." This phrase either indicates a dualism of synthesis and data, or knowledge is not raised above particulars. Since now things are a mere *manifold*, and since knowledge is the *unity* of a manifold, the *unity* which is knowledge cannot represent the *manifold* which is reality. For Lotze, however, knowledge is not mere unity, and reality is not mere manifold, consequently the above criticism of Lotze is simply due to a misapprehension on the part of the critic.

Having in this way laid aside the two first alternatives, Mr. Eastwood brings forward the third possibility, which he considers the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 321.

² Cf., pp. 308, 310, 475. Mr. Eastwood's notion of things is so peculiar, and so different from Lotze's that his criticism really misses its point completely, as will be seen below.

³ *Met.*, §§ 68-98.

only remaining, viz: "thought must be the unity for which the manifold of things exists." The first states, according to the writer, that form *is* the manifold or matter; the second, that form represents (is like) the manifold; the last that form is for the manifold. The definition then of knowledge will be: knowledge is the *form* for which the manifold of mere particulars exist. If, now, form can exist alone, and if the manifold can exist alone, then there is a dualism. If, on the other hand, they can exist only in union, there can be no things-in-themselves, no reality, nor can there be any thought. There can be only the union of these two, but what this union is we are not told. It is not things, for they are the manifold; it is not knowledge, for that is the form. If, however, it is objected that form and matter cannot be separated, and that their union is the real, what can we say about knowledge? Is it the form of the real? But according to definition, "thought must be the unity for which the manifold of things exists"; consequently, it is the manifold and not reality that is known. This criticism shows that the writer misunderstands Lotze in several points. These misrepresentations refer to: (1) what the term 'represent' means; (2) the nature of the object or reality; (3) the nature of knowledge. The whole criticism goes to show, moreover, that some such position as that of Lotze must be taken up. It may be stated thus: The human mind knows reality—how this is possible we do not know; our knowledge is not reality, but is *about* or *of* reality. To say that we know reality, and that reality appears to us is one and the same thing.¹

VI. We come now to Lotze's second criticism of idealism. The first dealt with Kant chiefly; and in it Lotze's contention is that appearance is not like reality, but is knowledge about reality. Lotze's second proposition is, that the concepts employed in human knowledge are not the metaphysical principles of reality. On the contrary, he claims that these principles are methodological, and do not express the complete truth of reality. They are simply man's way of comprehending the universe. The discussion in this connection is directed against the idealistic school of whom Hegel is regarded as a representative.

¹ *Mikr.*, I, p. 192.

Lotze's criticism of absolute idealism may be divided into two main contentions: (1) knowledge is not reality, (2) human concepts are methodological.

Knowledge is not reality. Ideas are not real things. It may appear to some that this is so obvious that any discussion of it is unnecessary; but it is not so plain as may at first appear. Realism, which holds that Ideas are real, is still maintained, and we talk of the reality of the concepts. A thing, according to this modified form of Platonic Realism, is no longer a reality in itself, but a system of categories or a judgment. Thus it appears that absolute Idealism is a form of Mediæval Realism. Of this Idealism Lotze remarks: "Idealism is right when it defends the conviction that the real in itself cannot construct the ground of the world. It is true that it is only the Ideal which is real. But the war against the absurd thought of a primitive reality has proceeded so far that all concrete content has disappeared out of the ideal ground of the world, and there remains no longer the *Ideal* (*Ideales*) but the *Idee* as the creative ground of the world, whose task is to develop the formal nature of the *Idee*, just as in a poor realism it consists in being the consequence of the formal concepts of the real."¹ Knowledge is put in the place of reality, the abstract is put in the place of the concrete. The logical concept is made real. The deity is no longer a person but the *Idee*.

The habit of thought which leads to this reification of concepts and judgments is common. "Whenever men have believed themselves to have discovered a principle which appears to represent the universal element in the constitution and development of the real world, they invariably go on to exalt it into the position of an independent reality, and to represent it as a pure form of being, in comparison with which the individual things retire into a position of subordinate and even unreal existence. I need not even refer to the latest phase of German philosophy which aspired to set on the throne of the Platonic Ideas the one absolute Idea; for the same tendency is apparent enough in spheres of thought outside the circle of philosophy. How often do we hear in our

¹ *Med. Psy.*, p. 157.

own day of eternal and unchangeable laws of nature to which all phenomena and their changes are subjected ; laws which would, indeed, cease to manifest themselves if there were no longer any things for them to control, but which would even then themselves continue in their eternal validity and would revive with their old effective power the moment a new object presented itself from any quarter for them to apply to ; nay, there is not even wanting on occasion, the enthronement of these laws above all existing realities in that very super-celestial habitation which with Plato is the home of the Ideas."¹

This reification of concepts is based on a confusion in respect to the meaning of the term 'reality.' As the term 'real' is ordinarily used, it covers a wide range of meaning, and groups under one rubric objects of thought which should be kept distinct. "We call a thing Real which is, in contradistinction to another which is not ; an event Real which occurs or has occurred, in contradistinction to one which does not occur ; a relation Real which obtains, as opposed to one which does not obtain ; lastly, we call a proposition Really true which holds or is valid, as opposed to one of which the validity is still doubtful. This use of language is intelligible ; it shows that when we call anything Real, we mean always to *affirm* it, though in different senses according to the different forms which it assumes, but one or other of which it must necessarily assume, and of which no one is reducible to or contained in the other. For we never can get an Event out of simple Being, the reality which belongs to Things, namely Being or Existence, never belongs to Events—they do not exist but *occur* ; again a Proposition neither exists like things nor occurs like events ; that its meaning even obtains like a relation, can only be said if the things *exist* of which it predicates a relation ; in itself, apart from all applications which may be made of it, the reality of a proposition means that it holds or is valid and that its opposite does not hold."²

So far as the human mind can distinguish, in the sphere of objects of thought which are called real, there are these three categories—being, occurrence, and validity. Now Lotze's conten-

¹ *Logik*, § 320.

² *Ibid.*, § 316.

tion is that we cannot go behind these concepts, and reduce them all to some one more general concept which will include all three and express by the laws of its nature the relation of being, occurrence and reality to one another.¹ If this rule is not followed in the formation of a concept, we get an abstract concept.² Each concept is *sui generis* for us at present. So far as I can understand Lotze, he maintains no more than that for us, with our present knowledge, these concepts are ultimate. Nevertheless, for Lotze these concepts are only human ways of comprehending reality. They are therefore methodological and not metaphysical.

Since these concepts are *for man* ultimate, since he cannot understand how they are related, and does not know the law of their dependence, all he can do is to *use them as if they were ultimate*. They divide the province of knowledge into three well-defined fields, and the investigator will therefore best avoid error if he maintains the definite distinctions which mark them off, and does not mix up the three categories as if they were interchangeable, since, in some way unknown to him, he believes they belong together in one system of knowledge. If we had a *system* of knowledge, then we might be able to know how these categories are related, but since our knowledge is only fragmentary, and is not a system, their interdependence is not known, and we ought not to treat them as if it were known. The failure to observe the distinction is, according to Lotze, the source of the error which he is combating. "Now misunderstandings must always arise, when under the persuasion that the object which we are considering must have some sort of reality or affirmation proper to it, we endeavour to attribute to it, not that kind of reality which is appropriate to it, but a different kind which is alien to it."³

This investigation has provided an explanation of the doctrine that knowledge is reality. This doctrine is due to the ambiguity of the term 'reality.' Reality, *i. e.*, the world, the universe,

¹ Cf. *Logik*, § 33.

² Cf. *Ibid.*, §§ 20-33.

³ *Ibid.*, § 316.

is real in the sense that it exists. It is a being with life, and is spiritual as we shall see in the next chapter. Whereas, on the other hand, knowledge is real in the sense that it is valid. It has validity but not existence. Now validity and existence are concepts which *we* cannot equate with one another, and each for human cognition is ultimate. "As little as we can say how it happens that anything *is* or *occurs*, so little can we explain how it comes about that a truth has Validity; the latter conception has to be regarded as much as the former as ultimate and underivable, a conception of which everyone may know what he means by it, but which cannot be constructed out of any constituent elements which do not already contain it."¹ Consequently, since validity and existence are methodologically ultimate concepts, the one cannot be substituted for, or predicated of, the other. For this reason the proposition 'knowledge is reality,' is guilty of confusing these two notions, and is therefore an impossible judgment for the human understanding.

It is not necessary to suppose that Lotze maintains that thought and reality have no relation to one another; for him they belong to the same world; but what he does hold is, that we do not know *how* the one expresses the other, how thought is valid of existence. Furthermore, he declares that "the relation does not consist in this, that a fixed number of concepts as *existing* are to us *things*, and as *thought* are the *ideas of things*; on the contrary, our concepts may be increased indefinitely without any addition to the sum of existence. And, further, setting out from innumerable arbitrarily chosen standpoints, we may build up the same whole by constructions of particular ideas, varying according to the variety of these standpoints; and thus there may be many definitions which define the same object with equal accuracy and exhaustiveness. None of these definitions *is* the nature of the object, though each *is valid* as to it, because there is no object of which the nature can be conceived by means of an Idea that is isolated, and unconnected with all others, and characterized *only* by eternal self-identity."² It may be supposed, however, that this failure of knowledge *to be* reality is due to the fact that we have

¹*Logic*, § 316.

²*Mikr.*, II, p. 327.

considered only ideas, and not judgments and syllogisms. But Lotze maintains that neither judgments nor syllogisms are reality.¹ But what can be said is that judgments and syllogisms more adequately *represent* or *express* reality in knowledge.²

The second part of Lotze's criticism of absolute idealism is that human concepts are methodological, and cannot be taken, just as they are and without modification, as the complete principles by means of which reality can be exhaustively known. Absolute idealism, holding—and quite justly—the belief that *reality* is an ideal system in which all parts unite to form the whole, and have their value in relation to this whole, sets out to interpret this system of reality in a *system of knowledge*. Its purpose is to comprehend all things in their eternal relations, and see them just as they really are, *i. e.*, as they would appear to a being who had a perfect knowledge of the whole system. How Lotze replies to this theory, we will now endeavor to explain.

In chapter I it was shown that Lotze uses concepts methodologically, and does not take them to be exhaustive analyses of the objects of knowledge. Thus it may occur that concepts seem ultimate. If they *seem* so, Lotze affirms, accept them as such, always, however, with the reservation that they are methodological, and necessarily are not ontological principles or final concepts. Complete or final they cannot be, for they are merely parts of human cognition. Nevertheless, accept them in practical scientific work of discovery as ultimate, for only in this way can we attain to definite notions. This advice is simply a *caveat* against hasty generalization, and does not mean that we are to accept as ultimate any conceptions, and renounce all further effort to understand their relation to one another. Lotze would be the last to deny the interdependence of our concepts. But he says we do not know in any *a priori* way what this dependence is, and since we are ignorant of their relation, we must frame our concepts more or less independently of each other, and base the law of their structure upon the mass of material which we have at hand, and for which we are seeking an explanation. If then we

¹*Logik*, §§ 343-345.

²*Mikr.*, I, p. 669; II, pp. 328, ff. 338; *Logik*, §§ 56-74.

bear in mind these two facts of method : (1) concepts are methodological ; (2) opposition to hasty generalization—it seems to me that we can understand Lotze's divisions of knowledge.

There are four ways, says Lotze, in which there can be a synthesis of the manifold in knowledge :¹ (1) "the synthesis of apprehension" brings "the manifold together into a simultaneous possession of consciousness, without combining any two of its elements in a different order from any other two." What Lotze aims to describe is what has been called receptivity or apprehension of the manifold. That he is not committed to the datum-theory is evident if we recall the fact that his concepts are methodological, and that he would consider it a hasty generalization to subordinate this 'synthesis of apprehension' to a higher synthesis. This synthesis of apprehension is the work of the mind,² and, moreover, there is reason to believe that Lotze regards the mind as unitary, and supposes it to act as a whole. The alternative to this view is that Lotze held to the faculty-psychology.³ (2) "The synthesis of perception." This stage denotes that the unifying of the manifold has proceeded further than in the first stage. The impressions of sense are sorted and united into the perception of definite objects in a definite world of things. This process of unification has been carried on below the level of conscious direction by means of thought. Lotze's words are : "This connection also is supplied by the inward mechanism of consciousness without any action of thought, and however firmly defined and finely articulated it may be, it exhibits nothing but the fact of an external order, and reveals no ground of coherence justifying coexistence in that order."⁵ (3) "Synthesis of thought" has for its object "to separate the merely coincident amongst the various ideas which are given to us, and to combine the coherent afresh by the accessory notion of a ground for their coherence."⁵ This synthesis works upon the

¹ *Logik*, § 20.

² *Mikr.*, I, pp. 226 f.

³ *Ibid.*, I, pp. 168-192.

⁴ *Logik*, § 20. Cf. *ibid.*, §§ 121-123. If we remember Lotze's use of concepts there is no need of difficulty here. These four stages are only a logical classification.

⁵ *Logik*, § 20.

actual plane of life, and among the actual facts, and endeavors to understand, and determine how they are related to one another. As the first two syntheses dealt with what we may call facts—sensations and perceptions—so this “logical form of synthesis” departs from the merely given, and seeks to explain the facts given by the two first forms of mental construction. This logical form of synthesis deals with concepts, judgments, and syllogisms, *i. e.*, with the *interpretation* of the given facts. It deals with the movements of the mind among its facts, and its aim is to discover the laws and principles of this synthesis, to understand how one part depends upon another, and if possible to express this relation in the form of a law, concept, judgment or syllogism. The mind begins with the facts, and passes from the knowledge of the one to that of the other, in order to observe the connection that is between them. This is the sphere of the *search for truth*, and the only method which is available is the realistic. The human mind is in this position and is compelled “to collect its knowledge piecemeal by experiences which relate immediately to only a small fragment of the whole, and thence to advance cautiously to the apprehension of what lies beyond its horizon.”¹ In this search for truth all concepts are methodological, and must not be taken for more than rough approximations to the complete truth. (4) “The complete synthesis of thought” is the last and highest degree of synthesis. Simply stated, it is the last form of synthesis carried out to completion. This is not an actual synthesis for human cognition, it is the goal of all synthesis, and, so far as man is concerned, it is an ideal toward which he can work, but which he can never attain. This synthesis, if reached, would be the system of knowledge which some idealists have supposed was within the grasp of the human understanding. “In such a synthesis we would have before our mind, not the mere fact of manifold elements in order, but also the value which each element possessed in determining the coalescence of the whole. If what we thus apprehended were an object in real existence, we should see which were the prior, determining, and effective elements in it, in what order of depen-

¹ *Logik*, Introd., § IX.

dence and development the others followed from them, or what end was to be regarded as their authoritative center, involving in itself the simultaneous union or successive growth of them all. . . . It is easy to see that a synthesis of this sort would be neither more nor less than the knowledge of the thing; as the goal of all intellectual effort, it lies as far above the province of logic as the first and second modes of connection lay beneath it."¹ This synthesis is nothing less than perfect knowledge which would behold all things in their eternal relations, and comprehend them as members of one complete system. In such a knowledge all things would be seen in unity, and philosophy would be all of one piece.

Of these four degrees of synthesis, the latter falls beyond the reach of man, yet it is just this fourth and unattainable knowledge which absolute idealism pretends to have. At any rate such is Lotze's interpretation of absolute idealism.² In reply to this assumption Lotze observes: "Only a mind which stood at the center of the real world, not outside individual things but penetrating them with its presence, could command such a view of reality as left nothing to look for, and was therefore the perfect image of it in its own being and activity."³ But the human mind is not at the center, and does not behold reality *sub specie aeternitatis*. It gathers its knowledge piecemeal, and for this purpose uses tentative concepts, and many circuitous devices to unify its knowledge. In fact much of our concept-system is little more than the scaffolding of knowledge; and our categories are all methodological.⁴

The concepts and forms of thought, or the intellectual syntheses which are used in human cognition, simply express imperfect and incomplete ways of viewing reality. "They are condensed expressions for a definite union of separable elements, which act and react upon each other according to constant and universal laws, and give rise in one combination to one set of results, in another to another."⁵ We can idealize our concepts till they are

¹ *Logik*, § 20.

² *Gesch. d. Phil.*, § 34.

³ *Logik*, Introd., § IX.

⁴ Cf. *Ibid.*, § IX; *Gesch. d. Phil.*, § 34.

⁵ *Logik*, § 144.

complete, but they would be only ideal, and not the concepts which we use. "The name 'concept' does not seem to deserve in logic that exalted significance which the school of Hegel has given it, and in which it claims to express the knowledge of the essential nature of the object. . . . There may be a *privileged concept* [italics mine], which follows the thing itself in its being and development, or takes up a point of view at the very center of the thing, the fountain-head of its self-determination and self-organization; but it is not the function of logic to reserve its concept-form for so very select a filling. By the logical concept we understand such a form of apprehending any matter of thought, from whatever point of view, that consequences admit of being drawn from it which coincide again at certain points with results flowing from that matter, that is, from the thing itself; and as the thing projects itself differently at every different point of view, there may be various equally right, and equally fruitful concepts of the same object."¹ This passage shows definitely the methodological nature of the concept. It may be expressed in this way. (1) Each concept expresses only an aspect of a thing, since there can be several equally right and equally fruitful concepts of it. (2) Since the concept manifests only a part of the nature of the thing, it beholds it only from the periphery, and not from the center. It does not reveal the object as it is. (3) All such concepts, therefore, are liable to change and modification, and can gradually develop and express more and more of the nature of the thing.

Not only did absolute idealism undertake too much when it accepted the categories as the constitutive principles, or the intellectual representations of these forms and their content, but it undertook an impossible task when it made the attempt to discover all these principles by the dialectic method. What Lotze says of classification of concepts will apply here, for his remarks are quite general. "Lastly, it will be asked, how classification by development reaches its required conclusion, the certainty, namely, that it has really found that supreme law or logical destination which governs the particular object or the universe at

¹ *Logik*, § 27.

large. To this we can only answer, that by way of mere logic it is quite impossible to arrive at such a certainty. The form of classification, like all logical forms, is itself an ideal, an ideal which is demanded by thought, but which can only be realized, so far as it can be realized at all, *by the growth of knowledge* [italics mine]. Nor indeed is this an exceptional condition, such as would lay this first of our systematic forms under a disadvantage."¹ Lotze goes on in this paragraph to say that this defect which was found in the concept applies also to the judgment and the syllogism. In no case does either of these forms exhaust the nature of the thing, and provide the knowing mind with a concept which fully expresses reality. Were there such a concept, then it would contain implicit in itself all knowledge, and such a concept would become explicit by the dialectic method, and out of it would unfold the complete system of concepts about reality. Since, however, each concept is framed from only a limited knowledge of reality, and expresses only the nature of reality observed within narrow limits, it contains a very small portion of knowledge. Now such a concept can be unfolded, but no development will get out of it more than is contained in it. Furthermore, this concept was formed from definite problems and definite knowledge, and in some definite field of enquiry. To this field it belongs exclusively; and even here it is only partially true. Consequently, were this concept developed, and applied generally, we would be using hasty generalization, a procedure which Lotze especially condemns. The obvious conclusion, therefore, is that our concepts, judgments, and syllogisms are methodological devices which the human understanding employs in knowing reality. They are only imperfect attempts to represent the nature of things; they obtain and express, as it were, only an aspect of reality, and in no case do they manifest that aspect completely. A complete concept, *i. e.*, a concept which contains implicitly in itself the whole system of concepts, judgments, and knowledge of reality, implies every other complete concept. For any intelligence, therefore, to be in possession of this "privileged concept," as Lotze calls it,² would require

¹ *Logik*, § 138.

² *Ibid.*, § 27.

nothing less than omniscience. Such a concept would reveal the complete nature of reality, so that there would be nothing further to know. It would reveal things just as they are. This concept, if indeed it exists, would be constitutive, for it would reveal perfectly the essence of things. On the other hand, the concepts which are present to human thought fall far short of this perfection. They grasp only a meager portion of reality, and reveal only a particle of its nature. For this reason they are not constitutive. They are not the very principles in reality; they do not even express these principles to any degree of accuracy, but are being continually changed, and re-adapted with the growth of knowledge. All our knowledge, therefore, is subjective, and is an account of reality as it appears to human beings.¹ Therefore the metaphysician "has to guard against the mistake of regarding abstractions, by means of which he fuses single determinations of the real for his use, as constitutive and independent elements, which he can employ, by help of his own resources, to build up the real."²

VII. In conclusion, let us briefly summarize the chief points in this chapter. Lotze's problem was to mediate between two antithetic doctrines. The first is that reality is unknowable, and only appearance is known. Kant, who held this view, maintained that we know only phenomena, for since all the categories of knowledge belong to the realm of appearance, there is no possible way in which reality can be known, or brought under the categories. The second doctrine admitted the Kantian position that we know only phenomena, but *called the phenomena reality*, and denied that there is any reality behind phenomena. Appearance is reality for this school of thinkers. Now Lotze objects to both of these extreme views. He does not deny the knowledge of reality like the first, nor maintain that appearance is reality like the second. His position is that *reality is known in appearance*.

Absolute idealism is the logical development of the Kantian doctrine that we know only appearance, *i. e.*, the mental construction of reality. Since only appearance is known, then the thing which is behind appearance is unknowable; and the later *

¹ Cf. *Mikr.*, II, 333 ff.

² *Met.*, § 83.

idealism was fully justified (starting as it did with the Kantian dogma that only appearance is known), in denying the existence of the thing-in-itself. But we must remember that this denial of the thing in itself is the rejection of reality in so far as it is not appearance. But this dogma demands a re-interpretation. If it is true, then absolute idealism is sound. The conclusions of this idealism, however, led Lotze to examine the presuppositions of this school of thought. Now the underlying principles of the critical philosophy and its developments is the assumption that only appearance is known. This assumption Lotze attacked, and concludes that in truth we do not know appearance at all. Reality is known, and known in appearance.

This criticism of absolute idealism explains an important problem. If appearance *is* reality, then our concepts are real also; and it is possible for any one who subjects his ideas to examination to develop out of them a complete concept-system. Lotze denies this. Appearance, he asserts, is not reality. It is only a partial manifestation of reality. Our concepts and our knowledge are therefore only partial. They are methodological and not constitutive.

CHAPTER III.

REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE.

In the preceding chapter it has been shown that Lotze regards reality as known. Ideas and thoughts are our knowledge of reality, and when we have thoughts or ideas we possess thoughts and ideas about reality. They are not thoughts about nothing, nor are they thoughts about themselves, but they are about reality. Furthermore, Lotze has demonstrated that thoughts are not real things, but they are about real things, and exist in a conscious being as "habits of action" or cognitive activities.

So far this discussion has brought us. But were it to be left here, Lotze's position would be given only imperfectly. It is our purpose, therefore, to continue our exposition of Lotze's theory of knowledge in order to discover more definitely what his positive doctrine is. To this end it is important to understand his conception of reality, and the relation in which the knowing subject stands to it. This is important because the theory he advocates is a departure from a good deal of the idealism of the day. This departure from accepted lines can be stated in this way: Kant and some Post-Kantians finding that things, as more than phenomena, are unknowable, held that the phenomenal world only is known. Consequently, the categories belong to appearance and cannot be applied to the world of real things. It is true that this school affirms that categories constitute the nature of objects, but objects are only phenomenal. Or to speak psychologically, objects are ideas, and groups of ideas, associated ideas, or even a union of peripherally and centrally aroused sensations. The object is plainly the mental construct, express it as we may. Therefore, we may claim that the characteristic distinction between critical and absolute idealism is that the former retains the notion of a reality behind phenomena, whereas the latter does not. But, as we have seen, Lotze mediates between these two positions. He denies that knowledge is confined to phenomena. In truth

knowledge is not of phenomena, but of reality ; and phenomena are an appearance or knowledge of real things. This change of standpoint implies a great change of logical theory. (1) It provides for a metaphysic in a way that the Kantian theory did not. According to the conception of Kant and Post-Kantians, the only reality is the mental construction, consequently the only metaphysic is logic. For Lotze, on the other hand, thought is not reality and metaphysic is not logic. (2) Since knowledge is of reality, the categories apply to reality, and connect or separate real things. For example, not merely phenomena, but real things are causally related. (3) Things are not selfless. They are a unity of states and possess in some degree the nature of selfhood. All things that exist have selfhood. Selves, however, though *Fürsichsein* are not Herbartian reals. They form a unity in interaction, and are causally related. (4) It is this inter-related world of selves, then, which is known—known inadequately of course, but known. (5) A change in one self is known in another self because the former interacts upon the latter, and produces an idea in it. This idea is the awareness by the one self of the other—how, we do not know. Because reality consists of selves, then, it can be known by a self.

Before we take up Lotze's discussion of the nature of reality, and its relation to knowledge, however, it is advisable to refer to an objection which will arise. The charge may be made that Lotze is now attempting a task which he maintained was impossible. He has over and over again insisted that human knowledge is methodological, and is not a system of knowledge. Now, however, it may be affirmed that he regards these same concepts as constitutive, and proceeds to give a metaphysic of reality.

Let us endeavor first of all to ascertain Lotze's own position, All human knowledge, he maintains, is subjective. It is the human way of comprehending reality.¹ This indeed is true, not only of ordinary knowledge, but of metaphysic as well. We may go further and maintain that if our most concrete knowledge is subjective, metaphysic is still more subjective. But the question

¹ *Met.*, § 94.

arises : How can there be a methodological metaphysic? Is not this a contradiction in terms? It is certainly a contradiction in terms if metaphysic is a *system* of knowledge in the sense which absolute idealism meant by a 'system.' But this is not what Lotze understands by metaphysic. "I readily admit that I take philosophy to be throughout merely an inner movement of the human spirit. . . . It is an effort, within the presupposed limits, even to ourselves absolutely unknown, which our earthly existence imposes upon us, to gain a consistent view of the world. . . . An absolute truth, such as the archangels in heaven would have to accept, is not its object, nor does the failure to realize such an object make our efforts bootless."¹ "For we do not possess either of Nature or of History such complete knowledge as would enable us to guess the whole of the divine plan of the universe; the attempts that have been made to determine this from meagre earthly experience betray only too plainly the unfavorable nature of our standpoint, which, with all the one-sidedness of its limited outlook, wishes to be taken for that topmost summit, from which the whole world may plainly be seen spread out below."² Metaphysic, therefore, is not a complete system of knowledge of such a nature that all knowledge and all reality can be deduced from one single principle such as Fichte demanded.³ This no doubt may be the complete metaphysic, but it is not that which Lotze attempts to outline. Metaphysic, therefore, like all our knowledge, is methodological. We may define metaphysic from Lotze's point of view as an outline of reality as a whole. It is an attempt to subject our concepts and knowledge to a comprehensive criticism, and to get a glimpse of what they all mean. Such a definition would be for the most part formal. We may admit then with Merz that the drift of philosophy is "to try to bring unity and harmony into the scattered thoughts of our general culture, to trace them to their primary assumption, and follow them into their ultimate consequences, to connect them altogether, to remodel, curtail, or amplify them, so as

¹ *Met.*, § 94.

² *Mikr.*, II, pp. 723-4.

³ *Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre*, §2.

to remove their apparent contradictions, and combine them in the unity of an harmonious view of things, and especially to make those conceptions from which the single sciences start as assumptions the object of research, and to seek for the limits of their applicability."¹ But it must not be assumed that this ideal means a system of knowledge.² A system of knowledge is not man's possession. "Our cosmic theory has not the unity necessary for knowledge, and our hopes lack that confirmation which would make them strong and vigorous. . . . We must to a large extent content ourselves with making clear what it is that we mean and that we require, without being able to show how that which we require and mean can be; we shall not be able to prove throughout the necessity of that which we are seeking, and to develop its whole content with the certainty of a strict logical deduction from undeniable premises, but must be content to remove the difficulties that hinder a living faith in its existence, and to exhibit it as the goal to which we have to approximate, although we may not reach it."³

Now it may be asserted this does not confirm the consistency of a 'methodological metaphysic.' Furthermore, it may be contended that such a use of terms is simply a dogmatic statement. Consequently, it may be admitted that Lotze understands metaphysic in this way, and yet it may be maintained that such a conjunction of concepts is a contradiction in terms. In reply to this criticism we may grant that if complete knowledge is necessary before an outline comprehension of reality is possible, then a metaphysic in subjective concepts is impossible. But it is not at all evident that metaphysic implies any such complete knowledge. On the other hand the very opposite seems to be true. A very imperfect knowledge may be metaphysical, just as a very limited knowledge may be scientific. It is not the *quantity* of knowledge

¹ *Ency. Brit.*, Article, "Lotze."

² By a system of knowledge we mean *complete* knowledge, such as an Absolute Idealism claims to have. In such a system of knowledge each concept contains implicitly all knowledge. When such a "privileged concept" develops it will unfold a system of the universe. But such a development is impossible for our methodological concepts.

³ *Mikr.*, II, p. 576.

that makes a scientist or a metaphysician, but rather the problem he is dealing with. Moreover, the experience of everyone who considers his relation to the universe, goes to prove that some sort of a metaphysic is possible. We do have some notion of the totality of existence, and think of it in this way. No mind is ever confined to the bare particular. In some degree or other every enlightened human mind has a conception of reality as a whole, and in a general way knows its significance and meaning. That we have a philosophy at all is sufficient proof of this fact. We may conclude, therefore, that human beings have metaphysical insight. Are they therefore possessed of constitutive concepts? This I presume is a question that philosophers will divide upon. But this 'division' seems the proof that human concepts and human knowledge are not constitutive, but, on the contrary, are methodological. For were they constitutive, did they express the complete essence of reality, it is difficult to understand how there could be so much difference of opinion among scholars. With this brief statement then it seems evident that we must accept the doctrine that we are in possession of a metaphysical theory of reality, and that this theory is methodological. It gives the outline merely. And these outlines form no set doctrine, but change as our knowledge of their concrete content changes. At any rate this is Lotze's position, and it is with his doctrine that we are concerned.

Having now learned that Lotze regards metaphysic as an outline survey of reality as a whole, it will be our purpose in this chapter to develop his conception of reality, and his notion of the relation in which each cognitive subject stands to it. There will therefore be two parts: (1) the nature of reality, and (2) the theory of knowledge.

I. Though human knowledge is fragmentary, and not a system, it *points towards a system*. All knowledge is a process of unifying our experience. "Every myth that gives a new and poetic form to some phenomena, bears witness to the activity of human cognition, that can seldom be satisfied with direct perception."¹ Knowledge is always striving for the ideal, for it is in unity that

¹ *Mikr.*, II, pp. 306, 307.

we behold the significance of things. "Youth strives to get from particulars to the whole, and not to the universal ; it seeks more earnestly for the one meaning of every phenomenon than for the numerous conditions of its realization ; and it would always much sooner discover the unity of the thought which binds together the disconnected fragments of the cosmic course as living members of a beautiful and harmonious whole, than inquire after the unattractive conditions upon the universal validity of which depends the possibility of all beauty and of all connection of parts into a whole."¹ This unifying activity of the mind which is the essence of knowledge "has been at work at all times, and whenever a view of the world more or less like the theory of mechanical explanation has developed itself, this impulse has met it with the reiterated demand that the world and all things in it should be regarded as a *living* development."² Everywhere in knowledge the aim of the mind is to bring together, and relate in consciousness our knowledge of reality, to bind together our separate experiences or cognitions of reality into a complete unity of knowledge. This must not be taken to mean that some kind of knowledge can exist prior to unity. All knowledge implies a *degree of unity*, and all progress in knowledge is a development of this unity. Everywhere, then, the knowing mind strives for a wider and more comprehensive knowledge of reality. But at best it can attain only a very imperfect unity of knowledge. Just as it is striving for unity, it is conscious of unity in outline and comprehends reality as a whole. But such a final unity is only an ideal which we can think in general terms, or know in outline, but cannot know in detail. It can never be known so concretely that the whole of knowledge can be deduced from it.³ Nevertheless this "idealism of youth" has often made extravagant claims for human cognition, and has thought itself "able to bring all reality into subjection to its fairest dreams." This temper, however, "is broken in upon by the realism of riper age which gives calm recognition even to what is unimportant when

¹ *Mikr.*, II, p. 309.

² *Logik*, § 150.

³ *Logik*, § 150.

it occurs as a fact, as one of the unalterable fashions of the world's course."¹ While it is true that the extravagant hopes of idealism, as a system of knowledge, have been restricted by sober realism, the fact remains that all the forms of knowing point towards a unity. Unity is the goal, it is what we aim at. It is the ideal, and when it is attained in knowledge we shall possess a system of knowledge. Since all knowing points towards it, it is a conscious end which we can outline in conception, but only in general terms. Though we do not know it as we know a particular bit of concrete experience, still as an ideal it appeals to us, and we accept it as the goal. Though we do not know how it will be realized, or what will be its concrete filling and its final form, yet, since all knowledge points towards it, we can believe in that whose solution we do not now understand.² "Nor is the validity of these ideals at all impaired by the fact that human knowledge is not able to apply them to every given instance."³

Our enquiry now has shown that, in so far as we know reality, we know it as related; and the fuller our knowledge is the more is the unity manifest. Now the objection may be raised that it is only knowledge which tends towards a unity. It may be admitted that *knowing* is a unifying process, and that our mental construction has the nature of a unity, while the unity of reality may be denied. It may be urged that we have no right to go from the unity, or partial unity, of knowledge to the unity of reality. This argument, indeed, is unanswerable if we start out first with a knowledge of appearance, and secondly attempt to obtain a knowledge of reality. On this theory not only is the judgment about the unity of reality unjustifiable, but we are not warranted in passing any judgment whatever about reality. Reality is simply unknowable, and this objection proves more than was intended. But as has been shown above, this is not Lotze's conception of knowledge. Knowledge is never of phenomena only, it is first and essentially knowledge of reality. Consequently, this charge against Lotze's position has no weight. If now we know reality

¹ *Mikr.*, II, p. 312.

² Cf. *Mikr.*, II, pp. 717. f.

³ *Logik*, § 151; Cf. §§ 120-151.

as a unity, there is nothing illogical in saying that reality is a unity. If knowledge does not mean this, then we have no knowledge. Again, we must insist that this theory does not make our knowledge constitutive, *i. e.*, express the complete nature of reality. We may know reality to be a unity, but have little knowledge of the details of this unity. Our knowledge so far as it goes teaches that reality is a unity. Now we can go beyond this actual realized knowledge, and on the basis of this knowledge construct an ideal of reality as a whole. All the reality we know is unitary, *i. e.*, holds together in one system, and nothing is independent. An ideal therefore constructed on positive knowledge and based upon the longings of the human mind¹ outruns actual knowledge, and finds rest only in a comprehensive outline which to some degree observes reality as a whole.² This ideal, then, even though we do not and cannot know it as it is, we can *believe* in, and seek to know it more and more completely, and comprehend it in truer outline. That we may not know reality, and that a criticism of the ability to know reality is required before we have any right to construct a metaphysic is an attitude which Lotze rejects. If we know at all we know reality.³ There is another important reason why we should *believe* in the unity of reality, even though we do not know it to be a unity, or cannot prove it to be a unity. Man interprets reality in terms of his own nature, *i. e.*, anthropomorphically. Since now the world is understood in terms of man, it will be reasonable to expect to find the nature of reality most intelligible when it is conceived after the highest interpretation of the self. Now Kant showed that knowledge and experience imply the *unity* of the self. Lotze also accepts the same doctrine.⁴ Unity is the essential nature of the self. Without the *unity of consciousness* "the sum-total of our internal states could not even become the object of our self-observation."⁵

¹ Cf. *Mikr.*, II, pp. 305-311; *Logik*, § 151.

² Cf. *Logik*, §§ 120-151.

³ Cf. *Met.*, Intro., § IX.

⁴ It has been customary to regard unity as abstract, and some of the criticisms of Lotze derive all their force from this tacit assumption. For this reason it is necessary to refer to Lotze's conception of unity. In no case does he regard unity as abstract and devoid of differences. On the contrary, unity for him is a unity of differences. Cf. *Mikr.*, I, pp. 152 ff.; *Met.*, §§ 68-98; *Logik*, §§ 351-365.

⁵ *Mikr.*, I, p. 152.

"We come to understand the connection of our inner life only by referring all its events to the one ego, lying unchanged alike beneath its simultaneous variety and its temporal succession. Every retrospect of the past brings with it this knowledge of the ego as a combining centre ; our ideas, our feelings, our efforts are comprehensible to us only as its states or energies, not as events floating unattached in the void." ¹ Furthermore, there is not only this critical deduction of the unity of the self, but we know, as clearly as we know or perceive anything, that the self is a unity, and the subject of diverse activities, ideas, and interests. Thus in the self we have direct experience of a real thing which is the subject of changing states, is in interaction with other selves, and behaves like any real thing. In this self we find that its essence is its unity. This reality at any rate is *one*. Consequently, when we interpret the larger reality, we must interpret it in terms of our own self. But since the self has many aspects, and since we can methodologically separate them, and consider these elements more or less independently, we can read the nature of the universe in terms of each of these aspects of the self. Nevertheless, in whatever way we view it, we are constrained to see in it some kind of a unity. If, however, we interpret it in terms of the self as a living whole, we will view the universe as a unity in the highest sense of the word that we know. As, indeed, we do not know *how* the elements of the self form a unity, so we do not know enough about the unity of the world to be able to deduce its concrete content from the one principle of unity. Notwithstanding, we do know the self to be a unity even though we cannot see *how* this unity is constructed. Now there is no contradiction in holding the self to be a unity, while at the same time acknowledging that the concrete filling of this outline is beyond human insight. Nor is there any contradiction in believing in the unity of the cosmos when knowledge of the details of this unity is not forthcoming. Not only is there no contradiction in this notion of unity, but our *faith* in this unity is firmly grounded ; for such a faith turns

¹ *Mikr.*, I, p. 154. A distinction usually obscured must be maintained. The critical deduction only proves that *knowledge* implies and is made by the unity of the self. But it is often stated that the mind makes *nature*. Nature and knowledge are not distinguished clearly enough in this statement.

out to be the indispensable presupposition of all knowledge. If we did not believe in the unity of the world, there could be no conceivable meaning in knowledge ; for in every instance in which we know an object we know it in some degree as a unity. If the objects to which the knowing mind is turned do not belong to a unity, but were incommensurable, then they could never be known.¹ We may then accept the *faith* in the unity of reality.

But Lotze is often termed a realist as opposed to an idealist. It is maintained that his philosophy is realism and not idealism. If idealism is taken in the Post-Kantian sense, then Lotze is not an idealist ; but, on the other hand, if realism is taken in the Herbartian sense then Lotze is not a realist. Consequently, the attribution of either of these terms to his philosophy does not signify much till the precise meaning of the terms is known. If, however, idealism means that the world is a system, in which all the individual existences have a place and value in relation to the whole, then Lotze is an idealist. Furthermore, if realism is the conviction that reality is more than the individual, but that it can be known only through individual experience, then Lotze is a realist. From these points of view he is both realist and idealist. Lotze mediates between idealism and realism, and for this reason his philosophy has been called 'ideal-realism.'² Achelis asserts that Lotze's philosophy is "an idealism on a mechanical basis."³

The question may be asked : How can a philosopher be an idealist and a realist at the same time. The answer is that Lotze is a metaphysical idealist and a logical realist. While he accepts the unity of reality, and claims that all things belong to one system, he still maintains that *our knowledge* is no such complete unity, and that we must adopt the empirical method in order to know reality. Reality is an idealistic whole, and knowledge must proceed realistically. In other words, idealism denotes a system of reality, while *realism is a method of enquiry*. A great deal of con-

¹ Cf. *Logik*, §§ 13, 19, 346, 349.

² Cf. Lindsay : *Hermann Lotze*, Mind, Vol. I, pp. 363-382 ; Vorbrodt : *Principien d. Ethik*, p. 4.

³ *Lotze's Philosophie*, V. f. w. Ph., 1882, p. 27.

fusion has arisen by not distinguishing idealism as an ontological system, from realism which is a method of inquiry. Absolute idealism has frequently confused these two views. It rightly affirms that reality is a system, but extends the term 'system' to our knowledge about reality. The result has been that a 'system of reality' and a 'system of knowledge' have been used interchangeably, and idealism has come to mean a system of knowledge. But, as we have seen, there is no justification on Lotze's theory for this identification of knowledge and reality. Idealism applies primarily to reality, and not to knowledge. Lotze, therefore, maintains that reality is a system, and that knowledge must advance empirically.¹ We will now endeavor to substantiate these conclusions from Lotze's own works.

In Lotze's criticism of Fichte, and of the deductive method in philosophy, he affirms: "this prejudice, which has become exceedingly harmful, confuses the idea which we must hold (*hegen*) concerning the essence of things, with our subjective efforts to know the thing. We believe that reality is a unity in the sense that all its content, however different it may be, must follow from the plan of the whole in a definite place as a necessary link of the whole. But only a spirit who stood at the center of the world and beheld everything, could deduce serially from this one supreme thought the details of reality. But man who is in the whirl of particular things, will, on the other hand, make use of many circuitous ways and small artifices in order to discover fragments of that system of the world, and to piece them together as well as possible."² Again, he affirms that idealism accepts the unity of reality, and that all individuals have their existence, value, and function, in their relation to reality as a whole.³ There is no doubt in Lotze's mind about the system of reality. But the situation is very different when we come to our knowledge of reality. "What the soul does, it does in virtue of the commission which it has received from the highest *Idee*. It will continue to exist, not in so far as it is a substance, but in so far as self-preservation is its appointed function or task (*aufgegebene Leistung*). But we are in possession of neither an adequate expres-

¹ Cf. Lindsay: *op. cit.*, pp. 365 f. ² *Gesch. d. Ph.*, § 34. ³ Cf. *Med. Psy.*, pp. 151-160.

sion of the highest *Idee*, nor of a knowledge of the definite vocation (*Berufs*) which it places upon its moments, its individual creations. It is therefore impossible to determine *a priori* what universal laws the activity of the soul will follow. They must be regressively derived from experience to which realism owes everything."¹ Other passages could be quoted which prove that Lotze distinguishes between the nature of reality and the nature of knowledge, and regards the former as a system in which all the parts have their worth and value in relation to the whole, whereas the latter is fragmentary, and proceeds inductively or experientially.²

This unity of the world can therefore be conceived in two ways—idealistically or realistically. When it is conceived so that the unity is emphasized, and the whole is made the important factor which gives reality and worth to the individuals contained in it, it is conceived idealistically. When, however, the parts are taken most into account, and the problem is to rise from the knowledge of the parts to the knowledge of the whole, the world is regarded realistically. Plainly, the latter is the method of research, while the former indicates a general belief in regard to reality. Lotze puts this matter in a clear way: "there are two general ways, however, of understanding the matter, alike admissible consistently with our assumptions of the unity of the world, which remain to be noticed here. I will indicate them symbolically by means of our previous formulae, $M = \varphi[A, B, R]$, and the converse, $\varphi[A, B, R] = M$. By the former I mean to convey that M is to be considered the form-giving *Prius*, of which the activity, whether in the form of self-maintenance or development, at every moment conditions the state of the world's elements and the form of their combination, both being variable between the limits which their harmony with M finds for them. In the second formula, M is presented as the variable resulting form, which the world at each moment assumes through the reciprocal effects of its elements—this form again being confined

¹ *Med. Psy.*, p. 160.

² Cf. *Gr. d. Met.*, § 28; *Gr. d. Aesth.*, §§ 7-10; Cf. also Seth, A.: *Phil. Rev.*, III, pp. 58-62; Royce: *Spirit of Mod. Phil.*, pref., pp. xiii f.

within limits which the necessity, persistently and equally prevalent in these effects, imposes. I might at once designate these views as severally idealism and realism, were it not that the familiar, but at the same time somewhat indefinite meaning of these terms, makes a closer investigation necessary."¹ Now these two ways of viewing reality are necessary. It is through the unity of the world that it has a meaning,² and that everything in it has a meaning, and it is because we believe that the world has a meaning that we attempt to discover in detail what this meaning is. But a belief in the unity of reality will not of itself disclose the nature of reality. Furthermore, if we rely on deduction from the nature of the highest *Idee* for our knowledge of the concrete nature of reality, we shall not find it, for such a method is a *hysteron-proteron*, and presupposes what it sets out to discover.³ Since knowledge cannot begin with the whole, it must begin with the parts. It begins with the facts of experience, and its aim is to combine them according to law. "The mode of their combinations may become known to us through the elaboration of experience: and this knowledge gives us as much power of anticipating the future as satisfies the requirements of active life."⁴ This method therefore groups facts, classifies them and combines them according to law. But "realism does not enquire how the course of the world came to be determined as it is. It contents itself with treating the collective structure of the world at any moment as the inevitable product of the forces of the past operating according to general laws."⁵ If realism were taken in this extreme sense, and did not have reference to an ultimate unity, "an understanding of the universe is not what this method will help us to attain. . . . But, even within the range of realistic views, the invincible spiritual assurance asserts itself that the world not merely is, but has a meaning." Although realism must be supplemented by idealism, and is itself nothing more than

¹ *Met.*, § 89.

² *Met.*, § 93.

³ Cf. *Met.*, § 93.

⁴ *Met.*, § 93; Cf. Klein: *Lotze's ontologische Ansichten in ihrem Verhältniss zur Lehre Herbarts*, pp. 34-38.

⁵ *Met.*, § 93; Cf. also *Med. Psy.*, p. 152.

the method of idealism, "at the same time it is only enquiries conducted in the spirit of realism that will satisfy the wishes of idealism. They will indeed never unveil the full meaning of the Idea. But there is nothing but recognition of the *de facto* relations of things that can make our thoughts at least converge towards the center of the universe."¹

Having now seen that Lotze conceives of reality idealistically, let us follow him in his development of the nature of reality, and ascertain more in detail his outline view of the nature of things. If we recall the fact that all knowing is an anthropomorphic interpretation of reality, we can maintain that the idealistic conception of reality is as complete an anthropomorphic interpretation as we can possess. This interpretation is in terms of the complete man, and will consequently reveal the imperfection of all theories based upon a partial anthropomorphism. Materialism is found insufficient because it interprets reality in corporeal terms alone. All forms of Eleaticism endeavor to understand the world in terms of thought, mysticism in terms of feeling. Lately Schopenhauer has attempted to explain the world as will. But all these systems of philosophy have taken an aspect of man and seek to explain the order and nature of reality in terms of this one aspect. Lotze, on the other hand, has made an effort to understand it in terms of man as man.²

Now how must this unity of the work be conceived? We have seen that it is a true unity, a unity in difference. The problem is therefore to discover the nature of this unity; and it is found that one form of unity which we customarily use is that of the *Idee*. In art, unity is conceived of as the *Idee*. It is the *Idee* which is the unifying principle in knowledge.³ May not this *Idee* then be the unifying principle of things, and also of reality as a whole?⁴ If now the *Idee* is the formal or unifying principle it itself is not reality. "It would therefore be incorrect to call the Idea, simply as the Idea, the supreme principle of the

¹ *Met.*, § 93.

² It is through our many-sided nature—thought, feeling, activity, etc.—that we can know what reality is. *Mikr.*, II, pp. 354, 355.

³ *Logik*, §§ 313-321.

⁴ *Met.*, § 90.

world. Even the absolute Idea, although in opposition to the partial Ideas which it itself conditions as constituents of its meaning, it might fitly be called unlimited, would not on that account be free from a definitely concrete content, with which it fills the general form of the Idea."¹ Form implies content, and in no sense can the highest reality be mere form. To consider the empty *Idee* as the highest reality would be to substitute for reality an abstraction, to separate form from its content, and to place over against reality the laws and principles which express its activity and nature. Such a reality as this could "only be reached by an extinction of all content whatever." Such an attempt, however, to understand the world has been made by all forms of Eleaticism. This philosophy proceeds by pure thought alone, and will accept no material content. But all these attempts put a logical concept in the place of reality. "These ways of thinking are only justifiable so far as they imply a refusal to ascribe to the supreme *M*, as a sort of presupposition of its being, a multitude of ready-made predicates, from which as from a given store it was to collect its proper nature."² It is no such doctrine that we mean to convey in asserting that the supreme principle of reality is to be found in a definitely concrete Idea, *M*, and not in the Idea merely as an Idea."³ Since form and content cannot be separated, the *Idee* as such cannot be real. Of course, a logical distinction between the *Idee* and its content can be made; but such a distinction is made only for purposes of discussion. It is not a distinction which exists in the nature of things. Reality is the "content of the Idea," or the concrete *Idee*.

If, however, this conception of reality as concrete *Idee* is so obvious, why has any other conception of its nature been taken? Why has the *Idee* been called the real? It is simply a case of

¹ *Met.*, § 90.

² The refusal to assign attributes to reality in as far as it means a refusal to make our methodological concepts constitutive principles of its nature, is a very valid and legitimate refusal. But this refusal raises concepts to constitutive principles when it affirms that reality is form only. We can deny that we know what the *definite* content of the *Idee* is, and at the same time maintain that all content belongs to the *Idee*.

³ *Met.*, § 90.

making our concepts constitutive. What we can separate in thought we conclude can exist apart, and this is a necessary consequence of the doctrine that thought is reality. Since man is a unity similar to reality, and can consequently be regarded as a concrete *Idee*, he is able to distinguish the form and content of reality. "*M* being in existence, or in consequence of its existence, it becomes possible for our thought, as included in it, to apprehend that which *M* is, in the form of a *summmum genus* to which *M* admits of being subordinated."¹ But the *M* or reality itself is a real existence, and not a major premise or *summmum genus* from which can be deduced that actual concrete content of *M*. *M* is rather the *Idee* in the content, or the concrete embodiment of the *Idee*. If, however, the *Idee* is used as a logical category, it is a form of reality, and not a genus in any strict logical sense.²

In regarding reality as a concrete *Idee*, Lotze does not mean that reality is, after all, thought, or a concrete thought. It has already been shown that reality is not a thought, but is that about which the thought is valid or may be invalid. As we shall discover later, thought or knowledge is a state of a real being or subject, and knowledge of another real existence or object, and, consequently, not itself reality. For this reason, therefore, when he regards reality as a concrete *Idee*, he does not mean that reality is ultimately only a category. In a passage already quoted from the *Medicinische Psychologie*, he maintains that the substitution of the *Idee* for reality is erroneous;³ what, then, does he mean by claiming that reality is a concrete *Idee*? This term denotes or expresses an effort of logical thought to think the unity of reality. And in so far as thought (*Denken*) is a real function of the self, its efforts are availing, and do succeed in grasping the nature of reality, but just because human cognition exists on the periphery of being, and, furthermore, because thought is only one of the functions of the self, its conception of the nature of reality is imperfect, and is, therefore, tentative and methodological. In maintaining, therefore, that reality is a concrete *Idee*, Lotze aims at giving a conception of reality as a unity. Everyone who

¹ *Met.*, § 90.² *Ibid.*, § 91.³ *Med. Psy.*, p. 156.

knows the use of a concept can understand how it unites many individual perceptions and other concepts under one law, which is the law of the unity of the various elements. In employing the term *Idee* to express the nature of reality, Lotze wishes to emphasize the fact of unity in difference, and finding a type of such a unity in the concept, he avails himself of the term *Idee*. This point is clearly maintained in the discussion on the nature of a real thing. "Reality," he says, "is that ideal content, which, by means of what it is, is capable of producing the appearance of a *substance* lying within it, to which it belongs as predicate. . . . If by the term 'Ideal' we understand such a content as can be exhaustively reproduced in thought, then such an 'ideal' (even if it be not apprehended as a universal proposition, law, or truth, but as completely individualized, somewhat like the idea of a definite work of art) would always remain a mere thought; and even if it were 'posited' as actual, it would not, in this way, obtain that capability for producing effects and for being affected, which we are forced to consider as the most essential characteristic of 'thing.'"¹ "Or expressed somewhat differently: If we designate the essence of a thing as Idea, we must have regard to the two-fold meaning which the expression 'Idea' then has. For, of course (1), the Idea, which we form from the nature of things, is always a mere image of thought, which, even if thought of as actualized, would still always be only an existing thought, and not an energizing thing. We mean specifically, however, by this word (2), just that essence of a thing itself which is never to be metamorphosed into thoughts in general, or quite exhausted in them; and we call it Idea merely because, if some thought-image of it is to be formed, it must not take the shape of a monotonous intuition, but rather that of a systematized conception, in which one law-giving formula brings a multiplicity of different determinations together into a unity."² It seems obvious, therefore, that the term *Idee* is used methodologically, as expressing partially, though inadequately, the nature of reality. This term must, indeed, be used with care, and not taken as an exhaustive or constitutive concept of reality.

¹ *Gr. d. Met.*, § 28.

² *Gr. d. Met.*, § 28 n.

Useful as this concept of the *Idee* is in rendering intelligible the unity of reality, it must not be taken as the real existence. "Things are not the thoughts of a thinker, but their being is so constituted that if knowledge of their content were possible at all, it could be adequate only in the form of a thought, combining many individual ideas by definite relations into one significant whole."¹ Though reality is represented in the form of an Idea, we cannot reify this Idea. "A thought, in order to become a thing, needs not merely the affirmation of reality, which requires only to take it as it is found and posit it, but the thought itself lacks something in order to be that which when posited would be a thing. The thought, however affirmed, posited, or realized, would remain an existing thought and no more, and that this is not quite what we mean by the name 'thing,' we certainly feel, although we may find it hard to point out what is lacking."² Were reality a reified Idea it would be a motionless system of concepts, "whereas what reality shows us is a changing medley of the most manifold relations and connections between the matter of ideas taking first one form and then another without regard to their place in the system."³ Reality is not a static position, but, on the contrary, is a ceaseless becoming, and a dynamic interaction of facts.⁴ It is therefore suggested that reality is an "operative Idea." Let thought develop, give it the power to act, then it can be maintained that thought in this sense is reality. Lotze, however, rejects this theory: "If we express," he says, "the being of things as actively efficacious Idea, we do, it is true, express correctly enough what we need, but as a matter of fact active efficacy does not on that account accrue to the Idea with the ease and speed with which we can bestow it on the Idea in speech by means of an adjective. On the contrary, it remains doubtful whether the name of 'operative Idea,' without addition or omission, denotes anything which exists or can exist; the presumption is *against* its validity, for it is plain that in it we transfer to ideas regarded not as thought but as existent, a power which demonstrably belongs to an Idea only when it is thought."⁵

¹ *Mikr.*, II, 630.

⁴ *Met.*, §§ 37-67.

² *Mikr.*, II, 631.

⁵ *Mikr.*, II, p. 632.

³ *Logik*, § 34.

The *Idee* is therefore an indispensable notion or category which assists the mind in attaining an intelligible grasp of the *unity* of reality. This concept is useful in thinking reality, but it must not be used to construct or deduce reality. It is an aspect "which truth wears to finite mind, and not the very form of truth itself."¹ Already we have an experience of our own self, and this teaches us that the Idea does not denote the highest form of unity. The Idea is only a logical unity; but the self is a real unity.² The self is an actual existent being, whereas the Idea has validity. Now so far as human cognition has been able to grasp reality, the concepts of existence and validity are ultimate, and no remodeling of 'validity' can change it into 'existence';³ nor can we predicate the one of the other.

This discussion plainly demonstrates that reality cannot be understood as a logical category. The category of the *Idee* helps us to think reality as a unity, and so far as it enables us to do this it is correct and a workable conception. But just because it does not allow us to mean by reality all that we do mean by it, this concept must give way to another mode of thinking reality. If reality is only a concrete thought (*Idee*), then it lacks much that we mean by reality. Reality is operative, efficient, exerts causal influence, changes, and is yet a unity. These attributes the concrete thought does not account for. Moreover, there is another reason why thought is not reality. Thought is monistic and static; reality is pluralistic and in motion. If, therefore, thought were the unity, this unity would be merely nominalistic, and the world would be made up of independent real existences. Such a view would resemble that of Herbart. Such a notion of reality, however, Lotze rejects. Experience teaches that there are real things, and, therefore, reality must be regarded as a unity of these real things. But what is a real thing?

The self gives us an example of what a real thing is. "Our ideas, feelings, and efforts appear to be in their nature the states

¹ *Mikr.*, II, p. 654.

² When this logical unity is reified we have what Professor A. Seth calls a "*focus imaginarius*,": *Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 28.

³ *Logik*, §§ 316 ff; *Mikr.*, II, pp. 327.

of a being, of the necessary unity of which, as contrasted with them, we are immediately conscious. . . . For these inner events appear to us as states only through the marvellous nature of mind, which can compare every idea, every feeling, every passion with others, and just because of this relating activity with reference to them all, knows itself as the permanent subject from which, under various conditions, they result."¹

Because man is a self, a living, acting, knowing, feeling, emotional being, he knows what it is to be real; for he feels, wills, acts, and knows reality in his own person. In his experience he knows one real thing.² Now, the problem arises, can he interpret reality from this point of view? The idea or conception has been discovered to be too abstract and too rationalistic to account for reality as we know it.

This reinterpretation of reality in terms of the self will be understood if we review the three possible ways in which Lotze conceives that reality can be understood.³ (1) Reality may cause an appearance to arise in the mind; but this appearance has only a subjective validity. On this theory reality exists, but is unknowable. This is the Kantian doctrine of knowledge, and we have already given Lotze's criticism in chapter II. (2) Since there does not seem to be any way in which the mind can go from knowledge of appearance to knowledge of reality, this second theory renounces the thought of things in so far as they are not appearances. This is the doctrine of idealism, as interpreted by Lotze. Lotze's criticism of this conception also has been given.⁴ (3) "Or, finally, we supplement the notion of things in such away that it includes the conditions under which

¹ *Mikr.*, II, p. 633; *Met.*, § 96; Cf. also Krestoff: *Lotze's metaph. Seelenbegriff*, pp. 18-24. Krestoff attacks Lotze's conception of the self from the scientific point of view. A metaphysical concept is not adapted to become a scientific hypothesis. He maintains that Lotze has not shown the necessity for the soul (*Seelendinges*), nor considered whether psychology needs to inquire after a substrate (Cf. pp. 25, 26).

² *Mikr.*, II, pp. 354, 355.

³ *Mikr.*, II, pp. 637-647.

⁴ Both these theories regard things as phenomena or as ideas: *Esse = intelligi*. The logical outcome of this view is solipsism, for things = ideas, and persons are known only as space-filling objects, and therefore they are simply ideas in the thinker's mind.

those demands upon their nature which we could not retract become capable of fulfillment."¹ This third path "amounts to this, that we add to our idea of things that which their contents seemed to lack in order to make realness possible for them. In fact, if the doctrine of Idealism reserves to spiritual beings the realness which it refuses to selfless things (and this it tacitly does), what hinders us from finding in this mental nature that addition which the previous empty notion of things needed in order to become the complete nature of something real? Why should we not transform the assertion that only minds are real, into the assertion that all that is real is mind—that thus things which seemed to our merely external observation as working blindly, suffering unconsciously, and being self-contradictory through their incomprehensible combination of selflessness and realness, are in fact better internally than they seem on the exterior—that they, too, exist not merely for others but also for themselves, and by this self-existence are capable of being after the fashion which we have felt compelled to require of them, though hitherto without any hope that our requirement could be fulfilled?"²

The first object we know is the self or "spiritual subject, which exercises the wonderful function not merely of distinguishing sensations, ideas, feelings, from itself, but at the same time of knowing them as its own, as its states, and which by means of its own unity connects the series of successive events in the compass of memory."³ Experience, however, gives us examples of other unities which are called things, and persons; but it is not till they are all regarded as selves that they can be taken as unities at all, or be considered real. Whatever is real is mind. It was necessary to take account of things, for they appeared to us as unities which persist through change, and which are the subject of various states. It is in order to understand our experience that it is necessary to regard the objective unities as things or selves. Anything which is not a self does not exist.⁴

¹ *Mikr.*, II, 637.

² *Mikr.*, II, 642. Cf. Klein: *op. cit.*, p. 63.

³ *Met.*, § 96.

⁴ Stählin claims that Lotze's reals must be denied existence since they are mere becoming (*op. cit.*, § 30). His criticism on this point, however, is too brief to be quite intelligible.

Since now the conception of the *Idee* fails to explain reality, a new difficulty arises, for the world seems to be a pluralism. How can unity be conceived? If Lotze had regarded things as independent reals, his conception of reality would have been the same as Herbart's. This independence would have despiritualized the reals, and have made them mere 'position.'¹ Furthermore, absolute pluralism is self-contradictory, for pluralism has meaning only in reference to unity.

The first way in which a unity of selves can be conceived is under the concept of 'relation.' Real things stand in relation to one another. This conception, Lotze finds, is not satisfactory. (1) It seems to imply that the terms related may exist prior to the relation. But he maintains that position is meaningless apart from relations. Further, if things exist apart from relations it is inconceivable how they could enter into relations.² (2) 'Relation' is a methodological concept, and does not serve to denote precisely how one thing is connected with another. It must, therefore, be guardedly used when the attempt is made to apply it to the real. Most of our concepts of relation have been drawn from the spatial attributes of things.³ But space is only a form of perception, and does not apply directly to reality.⁴ Consequently, concepts and types of connection found in spatial intuition cannot be attributed just as they stand to real things. The term relation, drawn as it is from the spatial manifestation of things, carries with it the notion of a 'between.' Relations are *between* things which otherwise would be unrelated. But to be related they must be held apart and yet held together. This is an example of the Hegelian antithesis in every concept. Relation implies a 'between,' and is the work of the conscious subject.⁵ In perception this idea of relation is given as a spatial between. As thought rises higher it carries its imagery with it, and thinks of relation as a tie or bond between things. And just

¹ *Met.*, §§ 8-14.

² *Met.*, §§ 10, 13.

³ *Mikr.*, II, 617-623; *Met.*, §§ 79-81; *Logik*, 337, 338.

⁴ *Met.*, § 113; *Mikr.*, II, 603 ff.

⁵ Klein: *op. cit.*, p. 58; Green: *Proleg. to Eth.*, §§ 28, 29.

as the spatial 'between' is the work of the subject, so the conception of 'between' is still a methodological conception or a *Hilfs-hypothese* which the finite mind uses to make intelligible the real world. "For it is thought and thought only which, passing from the idea *a* to the idea *b*, and becoming conscious of the transition, creates that which we call here a 'between,' and presents it as a mental picture which thought finds intelligible; accordingly it must always be a vain endeavor to attempt to ascribe to this relation, which at once separates *a* and *b* and brings them together, and which is nothing more than the recollection of an act of thought performable only by the unity of our consciousness—to ascribe, I say, to this relation a real validity in the sense of being something in itself apart from the consciousness which thinks it."¹ For sensuous spatial connections, which hold only of phenomena, have been substituted "supersensuous intellectual relations." But a supersensuous intellectual relation is practically on the same level as spatial relations, and cannot be taken as expressing the nature of reality, though it is sufficient to allow us a fragmentary knowledge of real things.² (3) A third objection to the notion of relation as a constitutive principle of reality maintains that it leads to an infinite regress, for if a thing depends upon relations, or if action of one thing on another depends upon relations, then this dependency has nothing to rest upon.³ Lotze therefore concludes that the concept of relation cannot be applied to reality.

Relation is a concept which applies to the spatial world, and also to our knowledge of the world. But the spatial world is plainly *our* mental construction of reality,⁴ and is, therefore, our sense-knowledge of the real world. For this reason, then, the term 'relation' is applicable only to the structure of our sense knowledge, and should not be referred to the connection of things as they are known to the deity, or even as they can be thought by human minds. Nevertheless, knowledge affirms that things are related. The question then may be raised: How can it be maintained that things are not in relation? This may seem

¹ *Logik*, § 338.

² Cf. *Mikr.*, II, 635; *Met.*, § 116.

³ *Mikr.*, II, 620.

⁴ *Met.*, Bk. II.

to make things unknowable: for if things are known as in relation, and if in reality they are *not* in relation, they must be unknowable. If, indeed, this were a correct statement of Lotze's position it would be useless to endeavor to follow him any further. But it does not seem to me that this is Lotze's position. Here, also, it is true that his point of view will be quite intelligible if we keep in mind his methodological use of conceptions. To human consciousness things appear in relation, alongside of one another, but Lotze maintains that if it were possible for us to have complete knowledge, then we would see them as they are, and we would then know that the term relation comes short of expressing the connection in which things stand to one another. Reality is fuller, and deeper, and richer than its appearance to us in our knowledge would indicate.¹ It is not totally different from what we know it to be, but it is vastly different. Notwithstanding its limits, our knowledge is valid so far as it goes, and represents aspects of reality. Our union with reality causes it to be translated into our perceptions, ideas, judgments, and syllogisms;² and the more perfect our cognition the more adequately is reality known. The objection to making relation a constitutive concept is not that it is totally inadequate, but that it lacks the completeness of a constitutive concept. If it is applied to reality it cannot be thought without contradiction, which proves that it is a *Hilfsbegriff*.³ Its character as a relation depends on our limited knowledge of reality, and on the sensuous appearance of reality to human consciousness. However, there is something in reality which this concept inadequately represents, for the real is known in finite concepts. What it is in reality that corresponds to our interpretation of its nature as a relation, *is of the nature of a relation, but it is more than a relation*. "This supposed 'relation' can only subsist independently of our consciousness, or objectively, if it is something *more* than relation, and then it subsists not *between* *a* and *b* (for this 'between' has no existence except in us), but rather *in* them, as an influence which they reciprocally

¹ *Met.*, §§ 76, 77.

² *Met.*, §§ 81, 105, 116, 123, 170; *Logik*, § 328; *Mikr.*, II, pp. 611 ff.

³ Herbart and Bradley both maintain that appearance is not reality because it is self-contradictory if taken as real.

exert upon and receive from each other. It is merely for us when we think it that such influence takes logical shape in the weakened form of a relation, which no longer expresses its full significance."¹ "We saw that the notion of a condition is inadequate to denote that which we mean by a relation which subsists in actual fact between two real elements; so to subsist, it would have to be more than a relation, it would have to be nothing less than interaction. This being so, it was in that real connection between the real elements that the cause resided which brought their phenomenal appearances for us into that particular formal relation which we now, employing a merely logical term, call a conditioning of the one by the other."² "In this case the conclusion is unavoidable that this objective relation *C*, to which we appeal, cannot be anything that takes place *between a* and *b*, and that just for that reason it is not a relation in the ordinary sense of the term, but more than this."³ Consequently, Lotze concludes, *interaction of one real thing on another* expresses the nature of reality more truly than does the idea of relation. "Apart from consciousness" relations "have not themselves an independent existence *between* the things related or relatable, but there is a foundation for them in the nature of things which are so framed that consciousness is constrained and enabled by their influence upon it, to connect and estimate by means of these relations the impressions which those things make upon it."⁴

Reality, therefore, is an organization of selves which interact on one another. The implications of this theory do not belong to our subject, but are developed by Lotze.⁵

All things belong together and are in interaction. Everything is therefore at once active and passive. Since, however, things interact, a change in one implies a change in another. If, for

¹ *Logik*, § 338.

² *Logik*, § 345.

³ *Met.*, § 81.

⁴ *Mikr.*, II, p. 619; Cf. also *Gr. d. Met.*, § 20.

⁵ *Gr. d. Religionsphil.*, §§ 20-32; *Met.*, §§ 71 ff. Stählin controverts this position. (1) Reals, he finds, are *modi* of Infinite Substance, yet independent, which is a contradiction (*op. cit.*, § 28). (2) There can be no unity of reals in an Infinite Substance, for substance is that which abides in change whereas the reals *become*. Becoming is self-contradictory (§ 29).

example, A and B react upon one another, when A changes from a state a to a state α , B will change from a state b to a state β . In this interaction, to be sure, A is not solely active and B merely passive. But they are at once both active and passive. Consequently, when A changes from a to α , it is not through A alone that this change arises, for A does not stand alone, and cannot be regarded apart from the rest of reality. Moreover, when B changes from b to β , through the causal activity of A , it is active, and from its own nature contributes to the changes from b to β . For it is not in the nature of A alone to produce a change from b to β . This is obvious when A 's relation (to use this term) to C is considered. Under these conditions A will not change b into β , but its effect upon C will cause C to change from state c to state γ . One thing, therefore, cannot change from one state into another without a corresponding change taking place in another thing with which it is in interaction. "A state a , which takes place in an element A , must, for the very reason that it is in A , likewise be an 'affection' in B ; but it does not necessarily have to become such an 'affection' of B by means of an influence issuing from A ." ¹ Thus it occurs that a state of one thing has its equivalent in another being. In other words, one object produces a state in another which corresponds or is equivalent to the amount of change in the first. This can occur only on "the assumption that all individual things are substantially One. . . . The formal consequence of this assumption is as follows: The element A is only $= M_{(x)}$, the element $B = M_{(y)}$, etc. Every state a which takes place in A is therefore likewise a state of this M ; and, by means of this state, M is necessitated according to its own nature to produce a succeeding state β which makes its appearance as a state of B , but which is in truth a state of this M , by means of which its preceding modification $M_{(y)}$ is changed." ² Now it must be remembered that this is only a formal or a schematic representation of what Lotze means by an organization of real beings. His object it not to show *how* they are related, and *how* such a unity is possible. Nor is it his purpose to construct a universe according to a materialistic or

¹ *Gr. d. Met.*, § 48.

² *Gr. d. Met.*, § 48.

mechanical plan. The real selves with which he is dealing are not lifeless bits of a huge machine, but living beings; and the unity which he believes in is a unity which he can think in outline only. We miss his purpose if we think he is striving to understand the essence of this unity and discover how it works. His aim is much less ambitious. He is only eager to maintain that reality is a unity, and that it is only in and through their ultimate unity that things can interact or have any influence upon one another. If *A* and *B* did not belong to the same universe, and share the same nature, if, in other words, they were not ultimately one—in some way that we do not and cannot comprehend—they could not be in interaction, and could not affect one another; nor could the one be aware of the existence of the other. This one reality is a unity of the many, for both interaction and the many imply unity.¹ Those who maintain that this unity is a “substantial One,” and an hypostatized conception, by no means do justice to Lotze’s thought.² Moreover, this criticism appears to disregard Lotze’s method, his tentative procedure, and his methological use of concepts. Lotze, himself, does not pretend to have “privileged concepts” which express the whole nature of reality; nor does he maintain that his concept of unity is adequate to exhaust the nature of reality.³ All he hopes to do is to suggest, and make clear what he means by reality.⁴

II. From the first part of this chapter we have learned that reality is a system or organization of selves. This doctrine consequently can be stated in four propositions: (1) A real thing admits of change, and unifies changing states;⁵ (2) “Reality is that ideal content, which, by means of what it is, is capable of producing the appearance of a *substance* lying within it, to which it belongs as a predicate;”⁶ (3) “Reality means for us the being of a some-

¹ *Met.*, §§ 68–75.

² e. g., Schiller: *Lotze’s Monism*, Phil. Rev., V, 3, pp. 225–245.

³ Cf. Klein: *Op. cit.*, pp. 56, 57.

⁴ *Mikr.*, II, p. 576; *Met.*, §§ 73–75; *Gr. d. Religionsphil.*, § 21.

⁵ *Met.*, §§ 24, 96.

⁶ *Gr. d. Met.*, § 28; Cf. *Met.*, § 31.

what which is capable of being affected and of producing effects ;"¹
 (4) "It is in the consciousness of unity, and not in the mere unity itself, that the essence of things lies."² "Only by sharing this character of the spiritual nature can they [things] fulfil the general requirements which must be fulfilled in order to constitute a thing."³

All these metaphysical results are of vital importance for Lotze's theory of knowledge. All real things are spiritual, and are in interaction with one another. This interaction is mutual, and depends equally upon each member of the unity, and upon the spiritual nature of each. If now we change our point of view from that of ontology to that of logic, every real thing is seen to be at once both an object and a subject. If interaction is the joint or reciprocal action of objects or things, it is equally true that interaction is the joint or reciprocal action of subjects or beings which are aware of their union with other subjects. Subject and object are consequently only relative terms, and do not connote metaphysically different kinds of beings. These terms, like all other categories, are only *Hilfsbegriffe*, and are not constitutive. For far too long a time they have been regarded as constitutive of two different kinds of existence, whereas in truth they denote only different aspects of one and the same kind of existence. In so far as they are known they may be regarded as objects ; but in so far as they are aware of other beings, or of their own states, they are subjects. Now this is the only conclusion from Lotze's conception of reality.

This doctrine is in plain contrast to that of the Kantian metaphysic. And as the Kantian conception is prevalent in the philosophy of this century, it will be well to discover just wherein Lotze's theory differs from it. Kant claimed that wherever the categories are applied to things-in-themselves, *i. e.*, to real things, an antinomy arises. This antinomy is removed when the categories are restricted in their use to the phenomenal world. Causality, therefore, on this theory, obtains only in phenomena. It denotes a relation of phenomena to one another, but cannot be applied to things-in-themselves, nor to egos, nor to the rela-

¹ *Gr. d. Met.*, § 26.

² *Tuch : op. cit.*, p. 44.

³ *Met.*, § 96.

tion of the ego and the non-ego. Furthermore, since the object spoken of means, generally, the object of thought, the object is the phenomenal object. Consequently causality holds between objects. The subject however is never a phenomenon, and can never be a phenomenon; therefore, causality does not apply to it, nor can it apply to it. The subject is the source of the category, and for that reason the category cannot condition it. Subject and object are therefore different in nature. The former is self-consciousness, an active living being, whereas the latter is a creation of the subject, a mere phenomenon which, therefore, has no existence on its own account. Thus, this theory concludes that only objects can stand in the relation of cause and effect, and that consciousness can never be anything but a subject. It is impossible on this theory for a subject and an object to be causally related; for were they so related the subject would cease to be a subject, and become an object. Neither can two or more subjects be related causally; for only objects can be related in this way. For the subject, however, according to this doctrine, to become an object, it would have to become a phenomenon. As a subject it exists out of time, but a phenomenon exists only in time. A subject exists above the categories, and is the source of the categories; but a phenomenon is under the categories, and is conditioned by them. A subject is real, and exists on its own account; a phenomenon on the contrary does not exist, but occurs *in* a subject. A subject, therefore, can not become a phenomenon, and is necessarily outside the categories. It cannot enter into causal relations with any existence without ceasing to exist.

Such was the account of causality given by Kant. If, however, we examine this theory it will be seen to be unsatisfactory, and must be supplemented by some such notion as Lotze has adopted. (1) According to Kant, only objects are causally related. Subjects do not exist in causal relation. By object he means a phenomenon, or a complex of phenomena. Consequently, causality holds only between phenomena. Further, phenomena have no existence outside of the mind which thinks them, therefore causality applies only to the presentations in con-

sciousness. It is plainly only a relation between the parts of our knowledge, and does not apply to objects at all. (2) Because causality is within phenomena, there does not seem to be any conceivable relation in which the subject stands to the rest of the world. Nor is it clear how knowledge can arise, since the object as a real thing is not related to the subject. Kant himself was convinced that subject and object are causally related, though he did not seem to be conscious of the contradiction. But Fichte pointed out the contradiction.¹ (3) Those who maintain that causality exists only between phenomena, and cannot apply to things-in-themselves, do not inform us how reality is a whole, and in what relation the various subjects are. (4) This conception seems to rob causality of all its significance. By causal connection we mean that one real thing exerts an influence upon another real thing. We think of it as a power or an influence which one thing exerts upon another. Causality is dynamic, and consists in an interaction of real things, whatever they may be. If, on the contrary, causality is only a relation between states of consciousness, and not within real things, its whole meaning seems to have vanished. The plausibility of this notion of causality as obtaining between phenomena rests upon the fact that most philosophy since Berkeley's time has regarded subjective presentations as real objects. It seems all right to maintain that causality holds between objects or between phenomenal objects. But this ostensible validity depends upon an association which the word 'object' carries with it. When, however, in place of the term 'object' its equivalent, a 'state of consciousness,' or a system of such states, is used, the specious validity of the doctrine is at once perceived. Nevertheless, this is the logical conclusion of the Kantian position. (5) Lastly, this doctrine not only extends a logical principle and uses it in an ontological sense, but it does worse than this. If it only used a methodological conception as constitutive it would utter a partial truth. But this view does not *extend* a concept, but reifies it. When we think an object, it is a real object. There is no object *in* consciousness. What is in conscious-

¹ *Sämmtliche Werke*, I, p. 486.

ness is *knowledge* about an object. But on the Kantian theory this is not so; there is no object except the phenomenal appearance in consciousness. This appearance is called the object. Now phenomena occur in time, *i. e.*, *these* objects occur in consciousness in a temporal series. Causality, therefore, is the temporal sequence of phenomena according to a rule.¹ It does not connote influence or a dynamic effect of any kind. How could a phenomenon exert an influence upon another phenomenon? For this reason causality taken as a temporal succession of phenomena according to a rule, is not a concept of the relation of things which are not phenomena but real. Since then it is not a concept of things it cannot be extended to things. Were it a methodological concept of the causal relation of things, then it could be extended, but of course inadequately. It would be the same fallacy if we were to use a psychological law of association as a law of the relation of things.

Lotze abandons the notion that causality is a relation between phenomena, and maintains on the other hand that real beings are causally related. Things, not phenomena, stand in causal union. This union, as has been shown, is interaction.

Since, indeed, interaction, or causality, is the way in which real things exist together, all real things causally affect each other, and produce changing states in one another. But real things are for Lotze either subjects or objects according to the standpoint from which we view them. Consequently objects are causally related. The same, however, is true of subjects. Subjects are causally related, and interact on one another. Further, speaking from the point of view of a subject, which regards or may regard all other real beings as objects, we can maintain that subjects and objects are causally related, and interact upon one another. For what is held to be a subject from one point of view [*i. e.*, as knowing] is from another point of view an object [*i. e.*, as known]. Subject and object interact. Referring to Kant, Lotze remarks: "Now it is, indeed, true that Kant has made the idea of an interaction of things upon us impossible, since he undertook the fruitless task of ascribing to the course of time only a subjec-

¹ Cf. Kant's Schema of Causality.

tive validity, and since, likewise, the concept of causality is applicable only under the schema in temporal succession."¹

Before we proceed to develop the conception of the interaction of subject and object, let us notice two objections to the position which Lotze holds—that things are causally related with the subject which knows them. (1) Green accepts the Kantian *dictum* that the 'understanding makes nature.' Kant, however, added to this *dictum* the qualifying phrase: "out of a material which it does not make." Green, on the other hand, cannot come to any terms with a 'material';² for nothing can be causally related to the self.³ There is therefore no material in the construction of nature. Nature is not real in the sense that a self is real; but it is real when its parts are related as they appear to be related.⁴ But the parts are only phenomena, and not real existences.⁵ Since, however, causality is only in nature, it holds only between phenomena, and not between real existences such as selves. But this theory provides for no unity of the world in any real sense. What is unified, however, is the experience of a single self, and that is all. To maintain that real things or selves are not causally related, because causality is a relation which exists only between phenomena begs the whole question. (2) Another objection we will notice because it is made with direct reference to Lotze. Mr. Eastwood, in his articles in *Mind* already mentioned, affirms that Lotze adopts the prejudice of common sense, and asserts the actual existence of real things independent of the knowing mind. Furthermore, he claims that, according to Lotze, these existing things produce ideas and thoughts in the subject according to the general principle of cause and effect. Against this position of Lotze's, Mr. Eastwood holds that only objects can stand in the relation of cause and effect, and that consciousness can never be anything but a subject.⁶ We have already seen that this criticism will not hold; but let us examine briefly Mr. Eastwood's own position. By an object Mr.

¹ *Gesch. d. Ph.*, § 36.

² Cf. Seth, A.: *Hegelianism and Personality*, pp. 79–83.

³ Green: *Proleg. to Eth.*, §§ 38–54.

⁴ Green: *Ibid.*, § 12 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, § 52.

⁶ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 313–14.

Eastwood means a manifold of particulars united by thought (p. 475). Causality therefore obtains between the elements in a presentation. Since then consciousness is not a manifold, but a unity, causality cannot attach to it. We may conclude from this survey of the doctrine that causality belongs to phenomena only, that this theory is based upon the notion that appearance or knowledge is reality. Phenomena are taken to be real things, and phenomena seem on this view to depend entirely on consciousness. Thought is reality. But this doctrine rests plainly upon a dualism. According to it, there are two kinds of reality : (1) phenomena, *i. e.*, nature ; (2) selves or self-consciousnesses. But the reality of nature turns out to be no reality at all, but only an appearance in a subject.

Returning now to Lotze's doctrine of the interaction of subject and object, we will endeavor to show how his theory of knowledge rests upon his metaphysic. "Cognition is only the particular case of such action between things and the ideating mind."¹ This thesis it is our purpose to exhibit in detail. It will be necessary, however, to keep in mind what Lotze means by things. Kant and Post-Kantians mean by things phenomena. Things in this sense, however, cannot be in causal relation to the self, and can never be a cause of phenomena. But, as we have seen, Lotze means by things something entirely different from phenomena. Things are selves, and have real existence ; whereas phenomena exist only in a thing or a self, and as states of a self they are knowledge of that self or of selves, or of things in interaction with that self. The criticism therefore which affirms that things cannot causally affect the self because causality belongs only to phenomena, is not a criticism of Lotze ; for it uses terms in a way totally different from that in which he employed them.

Lotze never doubts that things act upon the subject, and consequently, his problem is not to show *that* this is possible, but his aim is to explain in outline how this relation can best be thought. We have already seen that this relation between subject and object is not properly a relation at all, but is more than

¹ *Mikr.*, II, 348.

a relation, it is interaction. But let us give Lotze's own account of this process. As he himself says, his aim is to render intelligible "the mode in which the object of knowledge may be conceived as operating upon the subject which apprehends it."¹ To make his meaning plain, Lotze gives an express statement of his conception of interaction. "Whenever between two elements *A* and *B* of whatever kind any event which we call the influence of *A* upon *B* occurs, such influence never consists in a constituent element, or predicate, or state *a* separating itself from *A* to which it belonged, and just as it is, and without undergoing any change passing over to *B*, to attach itself thenceforth to this new object, or be adopted by it, or become one of its states (however we like to phrase it); what happens is, that *a*, the property residing, or change arising in *A*, becomes the cause by reason of which, given a relation *C*, already established or coming for the first time into play between *A* and *B*, *B* also is necessitated in its turn to evolve out of its own nature and as a part of itself its new state *b*. . . . That principle however gives us this result, that the form of the effect *b* can never be independent of the object *B* which experiences it; it changes with that object; and the same relation *C* which obtained between *A* and *B*, will as between *A* and *B'* produce in *B'* a new effect *b'* quite distinct from *b*. As little is the effect *b* independent of the nature of the active agency *A* or of the relation *C*; it changes with both; if *A'* instead of *A* enters with *B* into the relation *C*, it will become β , and β' if *B* and *A* enter into the relation *C'*. But all these different *b*, *b'*, β , β' will make up in themselves a complete series of events which are only possible in *B*, and *A* and *C* are only to be regarded as exciting causes, determining which of the many effects of which the nature of *B* is susceptible are to be realized at a given moment, and in what order they are to come about."² Now when Lotze has given this definite notion of the nature of interaction, and has shown that, when two things interact, the resulting effect is due to both things, he asserts that "the operation of objects of knowledge upon a subject apprehending them comes under this general principle."³

¹ *Logik*, § 325.² *Ibid.*, § 325.³ *Ibid.*, § 326.

When two or more objects act upon one another, they reciprocally affect each other, and states of each are produced which depend upon the two objects and their mode of interaction, or their relation to one another. But as all things are objects or subjects, according to the point of view from which we regard them, we may say that when a subject is brought into connection with an object, the latter acts upon the former, and the result of their mutual or combined influence is that states are aroused in each. Since, however, we wish to consider the object or the self which is taken as the subject, it will be well to confine attention to the state which is evoked in the subject. From what has just been said, this state of the subject depends upon the nature of the object which produced it. Were the object different, then this state would be different; if the object changes, then this state changes. This is so obvious that it does not need further discussion. Not only, however, does the state of the subject depend on the nature of the object, and change when the latter changes; but just as truly does this state depend upon the nature of the subject in which this state occurs. If this subject were different in any way from what it is, then the effect of the object on it would be different. This all follows necessarily from the notion of interaction which Lotze has given.

Both of these truths, however, have been overlooked. On the one hand, the nature of the subject is left out of account, and knowledge is explained in terms of the object alone. The classical representative of this school of thought is Locke. Locke regards the subject as a *tabula rasa*, which simply receives the impressions which the object produces on it. According to this doctrine the state *a* in the object *A* seems to migrate into the subject, and is there in the form of a copy or image of *a*. In criticism of this theory, however, Lotze declares that, "Every assumption, to begin with, is wholly inadmissible, which places the origin of our knowledge exclusively in the object; a very little attention will discover to us that even in the '*tabula rasa*,' to which the receptive soul has been compared, or in the wax, which it has been supposed to resemble in being a mere recipient of impressions, a spontaneous reaction of the recipient subject is

indispensable. Only because the tablet, by virtue of certain modes of operation peculiar to its nature and consistence, retains the colored points and prevents them running into each other, only because the wax, with its cohesive elements, presents the properties of an unelastic body readily receptive of the stamp and capable of retaining it—only by virtue of this peculiar nature of theirs are the tablet and the wax adapted to receive the colors of the stamp impressed upon them.”¹ It is plain, therefore, that the nature of the subject must be regarded in every case of interaction. A contrary notion, just the reverse of the conception of a *tabula rasa*, leaves out of consideration the nature of the object, and endeavors to account for the states or phenomena in the subject by means of the subject alone. Fichte may be taken as the representative of this point of view. On this theory the theoretical process begins with a free act of self-limitation. This free act being the first is groundless and, therefore, unconscious. This unconscious self-limitation of the subject is the world-producing activity of reason, or the productive imagination; and this groundless free act is sensation. This is only one of many attempts which absolute idealism has made to explain the effect of the object upon the subject. How satisfactory these efforts have been is still a matter of dispute, and we are not now required to settle this point.

From the above discussion, however, we are able to understand what is the nature of Lotze's theory of knowledge. When subject and object interact, states are produced in the former. But the state of a subject is a state of consciousness, or an idea. Ideas, therefore, are aroused in the subject by the causal activity of the object upon it. But it has been shown (chapter II) that ideas are knowledge of an object; therefore knowledge of an object arises in a knowing subject by means of the causal activity of the object. In regard to this question, Lotze maintains the point of view we have endeavored to outline: “Now our ideas are excited in the first instance by external influences, and this leads us to regard thought as a reaction of the mind upon the material supplied by those influences and by the results of their interac-

¹ *Logik*, § 326.

² *Ibid.*, Introd., § III.

tion already referred to."² "All our information as to an external world depends upon ideas which are only changing conditions of ourselves. . . . Our ideas arise from action and reaction with a world independent of ourselves. . . . Whenever action and reaction takes place—and cognition is only the particular case of such action between things and the ideating mind—the nature of the one element is never transformed, identical and unchanged, to the other ; but that first element is but as an occasion which causes the second to realize one single definite state out of the many possible for it—that state, namely, which according to the general laws of the nature of that second element is the fitting response to the kind and magnitude of stimulus which it has received. Hence definite images in us, and *produced by us*, correspond to the causes which act upon us ; and to the change of those causes there corresponds a change of those inner states of ours. But no single idea is a copy of the cause which produces it."¹ Everything, then, which acts upon the mind produces a state of consciousness, or an idea in the mind, just in the same way as the sun produces a state of what we call warmth in a stone. It must be remembered, however, that in using any such illustration as that of the sun warming a stone, a distinction must be drawn. In the case of the sun and a stone we regard both as objects ; whereas in the case of a tree and my own consciousness, we regard the tree as an object, and the mind as a subject. In the former example sun and stone are *sun and stone as known to the observer*, and the stone is not perceived from *its own point of view*. But in the case of the tree and consciousness, consciousness is considered from its own point of view. Now what is true of the relation of the sun and a stone is true, so far as a subject independent of both can know, of the relation of a tree and any person whom I may be conscious of. So far as actual direct knowledge goes, persons are as much objects in my consciousness as the so-called things are. The discrepancy arises through a confusion of the aspects of a thing. But, as we have seen, everything is both object and subject. Consequently, when regarded as an object it appears differently than it would if taken as a subject. But these are only partial views

¹ *Mikr.*, II, 347-8.

of its nature and of its relations, and we cannot therefore rightly pass from one point of survey to the other without allowing for the new circumstances, or the changed aspect.

Because a self or thing is both an object and a subject, these two aspects are not identical. It is sometimes maintained that the relation of subject and object is simply a mechanical connection such as is found between object and object. Things, according to this view, are spatially joined or related, and the relation of subject and object is claimed to be just a particular case of this principle. The principle of explanation, on this theory, purports to be derived from the relation of objects as objects, and it is *this* principle, so it is said, which is extended to explain the relation of mind and its object. But this is an instance where the attempt is made to explain the partially known by the less known. If, indeed, this were Lotze's theory; if he regarded the relation between objects—I mean the relation as it appears to us—as the primary and fundamental relation, and if he explained the relation of subject and object by this relation derived from what seems to be an alien source, he could be justly charged with materialism, or with attempting to explain mind in terms of matter, and on principles of bare mechanism. Lotze, however, does not do this. He does not apply a notion derived from things as *objects*, *i. e.*, as known in spatial forms, to real things. In other words, he does not interpret the relation of mind to its object by means of categories derived from the spatial aspect of things. He does not explain the higher categories in terms of the lower, but the lower in terms of the higher. Lotze's interpretations of reality are anthropomorphic. He derives his categories from the self, and not from things as selfless. By this method, moreover, he does not degrade the self, but things are raised to the level of selves. For Lotze, therefore, the relations in which things stand are more than what is ordinarily understood by the term relation. Things are selves, and their mode of relation is interaction. Consciousness is not explained in terms of selfless things, but things are explained by means of mind, and become selves. To be sure, it may still be demanded why Lotze holds that "the operation of objects of

knowledge upon a subject apprehending them comes under this general principle" of interaction. The answer to this objection is that interaction never takes place between mere objects. Interaction is a function of selves. Lotze does not say that there is a wider kind of interaction than that between subjects and objects. According to his theory, all interaction is an activity in which nothing but selves take part. And since each self is either a subject or an object according to the point of view from which we regard it, it is one and the same whether we affirm that objects interact, subjects interact, or that interaction is a function of objects and subjects. If we regard one self as knowing another, then this knowing self is taken as subject, and the known self as object. But they differ only in point of regard. If, therefore, interaction is considered as a functional relation of things, and if the relation of subject and object is looked upon as a case of this general principle, the charge cannot justly be made that Lotze is explaining cognition by a form of union which obtains only in the material world. Plainly there is no interaction of real things which are less than selves. To say then that the relation of subject and object is a case of the principle of interaction in which things stand, is quite consistent, and, further, it is what we would expect. Lotze's meaning comes out in the following passage: "The first thing we have to do is to endeavor to establish what meaning it is possible for us to attach to knowledge in its widest sense, and what sort of relation we can conceive to subsist between the subject which knows and the object of its knowledge, consistent with those yet more general notions which determine the mode in which we have to conceive the operation of anything whatever upon anything else. What we have to do is to obtain the last mentioned conception, which amounts to a metaphysical doctrine, and treat the relation of subject and object as subordinate to it."¹ Thus we discover the nature of Lotze's problem, and this knowledge of his aim makes clear what he means by subordinating the relation of subject and object to the general principle of the relation of things. For the purpose of making plain his meaning let us examine closely this quotation. This seems nec-

¹ *Logik*, § 322.

essary on account of an attack made upon Lotze at this point.¹ Now, the aim is to understand the relation between subject and object. That the one acts upon the other Lotze's never doubts. He assumes this as necessary, for without this assumption experience is left unexplained.² How can subject and object be related? Lotze could have begun with this problem, and when it was solved he might have gone on to discuss the relation of objects to one another. But he did not choose to do this, and he gives his reasons for not doing so.³ He prefers to begin with things, and discover the mode of their relation. This enquiry, as has been seen, led him to conclude that things are selves, and that interaction is the only intelligible mode of relation between them. So long, then, as anything exists and is related to any other thing, all these things are selves, and are in interaction. With this theory of reality Lotze comes to the solution of a logical problem. That one self can know another is evidence that these two selves—or if preferred, subject and object—causally affect each other, and therefore exist in some kind of union. How can this union, or influence of one upon the other, be understood? Clearly, Lotze maintains, this causal relation is just a case of interaction. The argument, therefore is: All things are in interaction; subject and object are things, Ergo, etc. In this sense then the relation of subject and object is a case of the relation of all real things, and is subordinated to this general principle. The phrase “those yet more general notions” need cause no trouble. It means that interaction obtains not only between things regarded as subjects, and things regarded as objects, but is the mode of all things that exist. But all things are after all selves, so this principle has the same connotation whether it is regarded as the function of things or of things and a self.

These states of consciousness produced by the interaction of subjects and objects are ideas. But we have seen that an idea is a bit of knowledge of reality. The nature of an idea is cognitive. By means of it the subject is conscious of an object. We know reality in ideas, and it can be known in no other way. In mak-

¹ Cf. Eastwood: *op. cit.*, Mind, 1892, p. 478.

² *Logik*, § 328; Cf. also §§ 322-333.

³ *Met.*, Introd., §§ VII-IX.

ing this statement, idea may be used in the broadest possible sense, and it remains true that only in idea can reality be known. If we use idea to connote any form of mental construction—let it be faith, feeling, will, or thought—which reacts to the influence of the object (and Lotze regards all these functions as mental constructions¹), it is obvious that reality can be known only in idea or a mental construction. To know in idea is simply to know. As Lotze has shown, knowing is not and never can be a mirroring of reality. Ideas are not copies of things, nor are sensations copies of things. Again, knowledge is not that of which it is knowledge. Knowledge arises in the mind when objects causally move the mind to perceive and think them, for our ideas are our knowledge of reality. Once we have an idea we possess knowledge of reality.²

The conclusion may be stated thus: When an object acts upon a subject it produces an activity in this subject. Now this subject is a knowing being. Consequently the subject knows either the activity or the object. If the activity, the object is unknowable, but if the object, then reality is known. How the subject knows at all is an unsolved problem. But it is no more an enigma that the subject should know reality than that it should know an activity of itself. In other words, it is just as easy, so far as we can comprehend, for reality to be known as for an activity of the self to be known. In fact the former sentiment appears to be the more intelligible. The mind is a knowing activity, and an idea is a process or form of this activity. A state of consciousness is not a thing to be known, but, on the other

¹ *Mikr.*, II, p. 662.

² This, it seems to me, is the fairest interpretation to put upon Lotze's theory of knowledge; for it is a conception which seems to run through his writings. Moreover, this interpretation seems more consistent with the general spirit of his philosophy. Nevertheless, the candid reader must admit that there are many passages which appear to conflict with this exposition, and with which it is difficult to harmonize them. These conflicts, however, may be only apparent, due largely to his form of statement. Lotze is not always careful of his terminology; *e. g.*, 'Relation' is a term which he insists belongs only to knowledge, and is not adequate to denote the unity of things. Notwithstanding, however, this definition of the term, he uses it to denote interaction (*Logik*, § 322). A good deal of confusion in Lotze's philosophy, it seems to me, can be traced to this inexact use of terms. [In this connection the reader should compare the author's treatment in an earlier article entitled "Modern Theories of Judgment," *Phil. Rev.*, Vol. XII, pp. 595ff. Editor.]

hand, it is rather the particular cognitive activity of the self in which the self knows a particular object. Thus it would seem that an idea is simply a cognitive activity in which an object is known. It may, therefore, be concluded that when an idea or state of consciousness is produced in a self by means of the activity of another self or object, this idea so produced is knowledge of that other self or object.

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